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IS A BURRITO A SANDWICH?
EXPLORING RACE, CLASS, AND
CULTURE IN CONTRACTS
Madorie Florestal*
A superior court in Worcester, Massachusetts, recently determined that a burrito is
not a sandwich. Surprisingly, the decision sparked a firestorm of media attention.
Worcester, Massachusetts, is hardly the pinnacle of the culinary arts-so why all
the interest in the musings of one lone judge on the nature of burtos and
sandwiches? Closer inspection revealed the allure of this otherwise peculiar case:
Potentially thousands of dollars turned on the interpretation of a single word in a
single clause of a commercial contract. Judge Locke based his decision on "common
sense" and a single definition of sandwich-"two thin pieces of bread, usually
buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese, or savory mixture) spread between
them." The only barrier to the burrito's entry into the sacred realm of sandwiches is
an additional piece of bread? "hat about the one-slice, open-face sandwich? Or the
club sandwich, typically served as a double-decker with three pieces of bread? hat
about wraps? The court's definition lacked subtlety, complexity or nuance; it was
rigid, not allowing for the possibility of change and evolution. It was a decision
couched in the "primitive formalism" Judge Cardozo derided nearly ninety years
ago when he said "[t]he law has outgrown its primitive stage offormalism when the
precise word was a sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader
view to-day." Does it? Despite the title of this piece, my goal is not to determine
with any legal, scientific or culinary specificity whether a burrito is a sandwich.
Rather, I explore what lies beneath the "primitive formalism" or somewhat smug
determination of the court that common sense answers the question for us. I suggest
Judge Locke's gut-level understanding that burritos are not sandwiches actually
masks an unconscious bias. I explore this bias by examining the determination of
this case and the impact of race, class and culture on contract principles.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 2
I. THE BURRITO UHAHA ..................BO ....... ... .. .. .. ........ 9
A. A Little Competition Never Hurt Anyone:
White City v. PR Restaurants ................................... 10
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I
thank the students in my 2006-2007 contracts class for their good-natured and incredibly
insightful response to the Burrito Brouhaha. I am indebted to Zanita Fenton, Peter Linzer,
Julie Davies, Ruth Jones, Angela Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Kristine Jensen, and Paul How-
ard, Pacific McGeorge's librarian extraordinaire. My deep appreciation goes to Jamie
Rizzo for her unflagging support through the many bumps and roadblocks on the way to
completing this Article. Finally, I am grateful to participants in the AALS Contract Law
Professors listserv, in particular Professor Michael Madison of the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law, who obtained the legal documents in the case and kindly posted them on
the listserv ... and so began my obsession with burritos.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
B. Interpreting the Clause in White City .......................... 13
1. Two Ships Without Peer, Twenty Bishops
and a Partridge in a Pear Tree: Contract
Interpretation in a Nutshell ............................... 13
2. Plain Meaning, Dictionaries
and Common Sense .......................................... 16
II. RACE, CLASS AND CULTURE IN CONTRACTS .............................. 21
A . R ace ..................................................................... 2 1
1. From Slavery to Freedom: Race and Contracts
in Historical Perspective ................................... 23
2. Does a Burrito have a Race? ............................. 32
B . C lass ............................................................... . .. 39
1. On the Existence of Class in
Contracts and Society ....................................... 39
2. Little Donkeys and Big Gamblers:
A Culinary Tour of Class ................................... 47
C . C ulture ................................................................ 50
1. The Culture of Contracts ................................. 51
2. White Bread vs.Tex-Mex: Law and the
Hybridization of Culture ................................... 52
III. CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, BURRITOS
AND SANDW ICHES ................................................................... 57
C O N C LU SIO N ............................................................................ 58
INTRODUCTION
hats in a name? That which we call a rose
by any other word would smell as sweet.'
Some might say a rose by any other name, but ...
A rose by any other name would wilt fast,
smell like bitter almonds,
God help you if the thorns broke the skin.,
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET 37 (Signet Classics rev. ed. 1998)
(1591).
2. COLSONWHITEHEAD, APEx HIDES THE HURT 5 (Doubleday 2006).
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Contract disputes don't usually make the evening news.3 And if I
had to award a least-likely-to-fire-the-public-imagination prize, it would
almost certainly go to the doctrine of contract interpretation. Interpreta-
tion is the process by which courts give meaning to the parties'
agreement.' Laden as they are with dueling definitions,' displaced com-
mas,6 and arcane aids to construction couched in a dead language (omnia
praesumuntur contra proferentum),7 interpretation disputes usually are of in-
terest only to the most devoted specialists. Yet, when a superior court in
Worcester, Massachusetts, interpreted "sandwich" to exclude a burrito,"
practically every newspaper, radio program, and blog carried the story.9
The resulting firestorm of media attention was something of a surprise to
say the least.
3. A colleague of mine who teaches criminal law offers a succinct explanation:
"There are no dead bodies." If the legions of law students who trudge to my classroom
every year with heads hung low are any indication, there seems to be a general consensus
from the uninitiated-at least at first blush-that without those dead bodies contract law
is "boring." In writing this Article about burritos, I hope to dispel that baseless accusation!
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981) ("Interpretation of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning."). Technically,
ascertaining the meaning of a contract can be divided into two processes: the process of
interpretation, and the process of construction. Interpretation is the process by which a
trier of fact determines the meaning intended by the parties themselves. Construction is
the process by which a Judge adds terms to a contract by legal implication regardless of
whether the parties themselves intended such a meaning. The modern approach is to col-
lapse the two terms into one, and I do so here. See generally PERILLO, supra note 53, % 3.9-
3.17.
5. See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.NS. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F Supp. 116, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("The issue is, what is chicken? Plaintiff says 'chicken' means a young
chicken, suitable for broiling and frying. Defendant says 'chicken' means any bird of that
genus that meets contract specifications on weight and quality, including what it calls
'stewing chicken' and plaintiff pejoratively terms 'fowl'.").
6. See, e.g., Konic Int'l Corp. v. Spokane Computer Servs., Inc., 708 P.2d 932, 933-34
(Idaho Ct. App. 1985)(holding that no contract formed between the parties where buyer
believed he was purchasing a surge protector for "$56.20" and seller intended a purchase
price of "$5,620.00").
7. Under the doctrine of contra proferentem, ambiguities in a contract are interpreted
against the drafter. See 11 RicIARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed.
2002).
8. White City Shopping Ctr. v. PR Rests., No. 2006196313, 2006 WL 3292641, at *3
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006) (ruling that "sandwich" is not commonly understood to
include burritos, tacos, and quesadillas).
9. See, e.g., Jenn Abelson, Arguments Spread Thick, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2006, at
Al; Michael Bauer, Between Meals, Is a Burrito a Sandwich?, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/blogs/sfgate/detail?blogid=26&entryid= 11214 (last visited June 3, 2008); Bob Sas-
sone, Joho the Blog, Aristotle's Sandwich, http://www.hyperorg.com/blogger/mtarchive/
aristotlessandwich.html (last visited June 3, 2008); Kevin Underhill, Lowering the Bar,
Judge Rules Burrito Is Not Sandwich, http://www.loweringthebar.net/2006/11/
judge-rules bur.html (last visitedJune 3, 2008).
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Like many who read only a short recap of the dispute in White City
Shopping Center v. PR Restaurants ("hite City"), my initial thought was:
"who cares?"' Worcester, Massachusetts, is not exactly the pinnacle of the
culinary arts? Why all the interest in the musings of one lone judge on the
nature of burritos and sandwiches? Closer inspection revealed the allure
of this otherwise peculiar case; potentially thousands of dollars turned on
the interpretation of a single word in a single clause of a commercial con-
I1
tract.
The facts of the case are deceptively simple: The owner of a shop-
ping mall entered into an "exclusive use" contract with a sandwich
shop-in short, the owner agreed not to lease space in the complex to "a
bakery or restaurant reasonably expected to have annual sales of sandwiches
greater than ten percent (10%) of its total sales."' 2 The owner subsequently
leased space in the same shopping complex to a Mexican restaurant sell-
ing, among other things, burritos. When faced with the threat of direct
competition, the sandwich shop invoked the exclusive use provision, and
it immediately sought assurance that the owner would not violate the
clause. In response, the owner was said to be "deliberately evasive" 3 and
refused to provide the requested assurance. 4 Thus, the "Burrito Brouhaha"
was born.
My interest was piqued. As luck would have it, I was desperately
searching for an interesting fact pattern to introduce contract interpreta-
tion to my first year law students. In the waning days of the first semester
of a year-long course-with tempers short, energies low, and attention
turned to understanding old concepts not learning new ones-my stu-
dents needed a charge if I had any hope of capturing their interest. Oh
sure, I had the trusty standby Frigaliment Importing Co. v. BNS International
Sales Corp-a case that asks the age old question "What is a chicken?""-
but to a classroom full of California residents, chickens paled in compari-
10. The other popular reaction is what I call the "duh!" response--as in Duh! How
could anyone doubt that a burrito is not a sandwich? See e.g., Squawkbox Noise,
http://squawkboxnoise.wordpress.com/2006/11/11/i-am-glad-we-cleared-that-up (Nov.
11, 2006, 10:52 AM) (maintaining that "[a]ll of this could have been settled out of court
had the judge in the case had the intestinal fortitude to call this case what it was 'frivo-
lous.' "). In Part II, I explore some of the unconscious assumptions and prejudices
underlying the "duh!" response.
11. See Brief of Defendant at 9, White City Shopping Ctr v. PR Rests., No.
2006196313, 2006 WL 3292641 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006). Defendant PR Restau-
rants insists that its actual monetary damages are difficult to quantify, as it includes loss of
goodwill-presumably priceless. See id.
12. hite City, 2006 WL 3292641, at *1.
13. Brief of Defendant, supra note 11,at 3.
14. Id.
15. Frigalinent, 190 F. Supp. at 117. As an added bonus, the "chicken case" was au-
thored by Judge Friendly. Id. Somehow, that usually elicits a chuckle even from first year
law students who by now are rather jaded in the ways of the law.
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son to burritos. In my grateful hands, the facts of White City quickly
formed the backdrop for my own burrito hypothetical.
The results of the exercise were spectacular as students plunged into
the complexities of interpreting the term "sandwich". But the most in-
triguing moment came during the mock trial when one student implored
me to refrain from interpreting "sandwich" in a culturally biased manner.
I found myself surprised and rather amused at the novel experience
of having a white female student remind me, a black woman, of the need
for cultural sensitivity. I was born in Haiti and grew up in New York
City (surely the most diverse city in the nation). As an international trade
and development lawyer, I spent years living out of suitcases in Europe,
Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. The need for a racially, culturally, and
class-sensitive approach to law was hardly news to me. Despite my appre-
ciation for differing perspectives, however, I had not conceived of the
exercise as anything more than an aid to understanding interpretation.
In the days following the burrito exercise, I found myself coming
back to the student's remark as I obsessively read and re-read the court's
decision. What struck me about the opinion was its almost complete lack
of analysis. Citing no authority, the court summarily determined there
was no ambiguity in the term sandwich." It then applied "common
sense" and one dictionary definition of the word-"two thin pieces of
bread, usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese, or savory
mixture) 8 spread between them"'9--to conclude a burrito is not a sand-
wich. The only barrier to the burrito's entry into the sacred realm of
sandwiches is an additional piece of bread?2' But is it really true that a
16. I use the word "black" deliberately here. While I always refer to blacks born in
the United States as "African American", for some of us the term is not nearly inclusive
enough. As a Haitian-born woman raised in Brooklyn, and having spent years living and
working in Africa, embracing the designation "African American" to my mind is only a
partial truth, denying large parts of who I am.
17. White City, 2006 WL 3292641,.at *3.
18. Given the rather heaping portions Americans insist on serving themselves, most
sandwiches do not consist of a thin layer of savory anything. Would a heaping portion
prevent a sandwich from being classified as such? Consider the Dagwood-a multi-layered
sandwich with a variety of fillings; it is said to attain such a tremendous size and infinite
variety of contents as to stun the imagination, sight, and stomach of all but the original
maker. The term originated in the 1930s after a comic strip character named Dagwood
Bumstead, created by Murat Bernard "Chic" Young (1901-1973). Linda Stradley, History
of Hoagies, Submarine Sandwiches, Po' Boys Sandwiches, Dagwood Sandwiches, & Italian
Sandwiches, http://whatscookingamerica.net/History/HoagieSubmarinePoBoy.htm (last
visited June 3, 2008).
19. White City, 2006 WL 3292641, at *3 (quoting WEBSTER's ThiRD NEW IN'TERN'A-
TIONAL DICTIONARY (2002)).
20. Id.
21. Tortillas-the base of all burritos-is generally regarded as bread. See, e.g., Sabri-
tas v. US., 998 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (U.S. Ct. Int'l Trade 1998) (noting that "tortillas are
unquestionably commonly and commercially accepted as bread in the United States").
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sandwich must be made of two pieces of bread?22 What about the one-slice,
open-face sandwich? 23 Or the perennial favorite-the club sandwich,
typically served as a double-decker with three pieces of bread?24 What
about wraps?2 The court's definition lacked subtlety, complexity, or nu-
ance; it was rigid, not allowing for the possibility of change and evolution.
It was a decision couched in the "primitive formalism"Judge Cardozo so
abhorred when he said almost ninety years ago:
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when
the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was
fatal. It takes a broader view to-day.26
The White City opinion was unsatisfying precisely because it failed
to take a broader view. Over the centuries, contract law has undergone an
astonishing transformation in the face of evolutionary changes in society.
Even the sacrosanct notion of freedom of contract has had to give way to
allow courts to police contracts for unfair bargaining. Almost certainly, the
sandwich has experienced a metamorphic shift from its early aristocratic
roots. As food expert Alan Davidson notes, "Sandwiches take so many
forms in the modern world ... that a catalogue would be a book."2 Both
contract doctrine and sandwiches have evolved, but Judge Locke's deci-
sion remains mired in an anachronistic "primitive formalism." What
accounts for that reality?
While the court questions that presumption in passing in a footnote, the tortilla's status as
bread was not at issue in the opinion. See id. at 1128, FN 2. Thus, for purposes of this Arti-
cle, I assume tortillas are bread and that a burrito consists of one slice of bread.
22. A gyro is served open-face on a single slice of pita. JACQUES L. ROLLAND &
CtARot SHERMAN, THE FoOD ENCYCOPEDIA 312 (2006) (noting a gyro is a "sandwich of
sliced lamb or chicken ... served in a thick toasted pita.").
23. The open-face sandwich (also known as open sandwich or open faced
sandwich) "consist[s] of one slice of bread with one or more food items on top of it."
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opensandwich (last visited June 3, 2008).
Probably the most famous of the open-face sandwiches is the Scandinavian variety, includ-
ing the Danish smorrebrod-a delicacy consisting of a piece of buttered rye bread topped
with homemade cold cuts, pieces of meat or fish, cheese or other spreads. Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuisine of Denmark (scroll down to "Contents" text box;
then follow "3.2.1 P5leg and smorrebrod (open sandwiches)" hyperlink) (last visited June
3,2008).
24. ALAN DAVIDSON, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO FOOD 692 (Oxford Univ. Press
1999) (noting that a club sandwich "is usually a three-decker toast affair, with chicken,
mayonnaise, lettuce, tomato, and bacon").
25. "A wrap is a variant of a sandwich which includes traditional sandwich fillings
wrapped in a pita or soft flour tortilla, a lavash or other soft flatbread"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wrap_%28food%29 (as visited on August 20, 2007).
26. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214,214 (N.Y 1917).
27. John Montagu, the Fourth Earl of Sandwich, is credited with inventing "the
sandwich." Davidson, supra note 24, at 692.
28. Id.
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Despite the title of this piece, my goal is not to determine with any
legal, scientific, or culinary specificity whether a burrito is a sandwich.
Rather, I explore what lies beneath the somewhat smug determination of
the White City court that "common sense," and a rather formalistic read-
ing of the word "sandwich," answers the question for us. At the risk of
being misunderstood, I am suggesting that courts must add to, rather than
abandon, common sense when analyzing legal questions.
Common sense is a subjective emotion, which sometimes serves as a
proxy for unconscious bias and the perpetuation of status quo thinking. A
judge's common sense intuitive reaction must be tempered by her more
consciously analytical faculties. Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski has written
extensively on the question of how judges arrive at decisions. 2 Rachlinski
observes that "accurate judicial decision making regulates judges who
know when to suppress their intuition and engage in deliberative assess-
ment of the case before them."30 In short, a judge's common sense or gut-
level intuitive reactions-while permissible and useful-must undergo a
second layer of logical, deliberative reasoning if she is to arrive at a truly
holistic and fully-formed assessment of the case.3' Relying exclusively on
common sense simply is not enough-particularly given the role race,
class, and culture has played in American society and in the evolution of
contract doctrine.
To say that race, class, and culture influence law is neither novel nor
32particularly radical at this point. Even a traditionally staid and doctrinal
29. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Heuristics
and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges, 163 JOUArA OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOM-
ics 167 (2007); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Dfficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251
(2005); Chris Guthrie,Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew Wistrich, Cognitive Illusions in Judicial
Decision Making, 86-1 JUDICATiVE 44 (Jul.-Aug. 2002).
30. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Presentation at Boalt
Hall conference on Law and Emotion: Judicial Intuition (Feb. 8, 2007).
31. System 1 is reactive and effective where decisions are made intuitively, as Judge
Locke did, while system 2 is logical where decisions are made deliberately. See, e.g., Chris
Guthrie,Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 ComNEL L. REV. 1 (2007).
32. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997 (1985); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists and Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. R.Ev. 1247
(1999); Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law,
31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 889 (1997); Amy Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and
White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 269
(1994); Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism,
Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous. L. REv. 791 (1991); Deborah Waire Post; Race, Riots and the
Rule of Law, 70 DEN\V. U. L. REV. 237 (1993); Alice Belcher, A Feminist Perspective on Con-
tract Theoriesfriom Law and Economics, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 29 (2000); Mary Joe Frug,
Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. Rev. 1065
(1985); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. Pev. 1235 (1998);
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subject like contract law has made room for those who bring a critical
perspective to the exploration of key concepts in the discipline. 3 Using
the wealth of available critical literature as the framework for my own
analysis, I embark on a journey to unveil the hidden and unconscious
manifestations of race, class, and culture that help explain the outcome in
White City.
In Part I, I set out the facts and circumstances surrounding the
"Burrito Brouhaha" and identify a number of discrepancies in the court's
analysis. I argue the term "sandwich" as used in the disputed lease is am-
biguous and as such the court's resort to common sense and a single
dictionary definition of the term fails to do justice to the complexity of
the question raised. I further suggest the court's gut-level understanding
that burritos are not sandwiches actually masks an unconscious bias. By
this, I do not mean to reduce the complex mdlange of factors leading to
the courts opinion to a crude and simplistic'accusation that "the judge is a
racist.- 4 Rather, the court's over-reliance on common sense, or some
common understanding of "sandwich" shared by society, is influenced by
race, class and cultural considerations because society itself is so influ-
enced.
In Part II, I begin with a historical analysis of the way race, class, and
culture have influenced contract law. To examine the impact of race on
contracts, I draw from several periods in U.S. history-from slavery to the
Reconstruction Era, to the Great Migration of southern blacks to north-
ern cities, and ultimately to the early Civil Rights movement.
With respect to class, I begin by grappling with the "American
Enigma": Why is it that despite the great disparities in wealth, prestige,
and power in society, Americans cling to the notion that class does not
exist in the United States? I then examine the various definitions of class
and ultimately conclude -despite the vehement denials as to its exis-
tence, and notwithstanding the difficulty in pinning down a suitable
definition-class does exist in American society. To further my point, I ex-
amine the foundational principle of freedom of contract and suggest that
embodied in the principle is the traditional notion of a "classless" society.
However, freedom of contract has had to give way to policing doctrines
such as unconscionability, which recognizes disparities in bargaining
power, precisely because such a classless society is no more than a legal
fiction.
Culture also influences the law and is influenced by the law. Thus, I
examine the culture of contracts; that is the set of customs, beliefs, and
shared understandings that exist within society, which contract doctrine
Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-
Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 799 (2003).
33. See supra note 32.
34. I certainly do not presume racial animus on Judge Locke's part merely because
he authored this opinion.
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incorporates into every agreement. I examine the impact of culture both
when disputing parties share a common understanding and when they do
not.
The impact of race, class, and culture is not limited to history, how-
ever. Thus, in Part II I also examine their impact in the White City dispute.
When the decision was announced, it was met with what I term the
"Duh!" response; there was an overwhelming chorus of agreement that of
course a burrito is not a sandwich. I explore this "duh!" affect and suggest
its roots can be traced back to race, class and culture. I set off on a culi-
nary tour of burritos and sandwiches-from their birthplace in Mexico
and England respectively-and trace their integration into American soci-
ety. Can a burrito be said to have a race? I argue that it can, and that race
is Mexican. The sandwich, however, is perceived as race-neutral. I suggest
these differing perceptions of race help to explain the different experi-
ences sandwiches and burritos faced in their integration into American
society.
Finally, I analyze the role culture played in White City. Like many
European immigrant groups, the sandwich was seamlessly integrated into
American society--so much so that few are aware of its foreign ancestry.
Burritos-like Mexicans-have been incorporated without losing their
status as "foreign" or "the other." Part of the explanation for that different
experience is the difference in culture of the two items.
In Part III, I reflect on the proper role of context in giving meaning
to contractual agreements. A judge's role in the interpretation of a con-
tract is to define a disputed term in such a way that it does justice to the
underlying objectives of the parties to the contract. Contract doctrine will
sometimes seek an easy way out of this complex task. For example, courts
may resort to maxims of interpretation such as a rule that calls for inter-
preting a disputed term against the drafter. For the most part, however,
modern contract law recognizes the central role of context in giving
meaning to contractual terms. But whose context are we talking about?
The objective theory of contracts teaches we must interpret terms in the
manner of a dispassionate third-party observer. Of course, no such human
being has yet been created. The context of our understanding of a par-
ticular term is influenced by society, and by the impact race, class and
culture has on our society. Part III calls for a broader interpretation of
context-one that will bend with our rapidly changing society, rather
than break from its inability to evolve.
I.THE BURRITO BROUHAHA
The White City dispute on its face involves a traditional commercial
transaction. The parties negotiated and executed a complicated lease
agreement meant to protect both of their economic interests. In the proc-
ess, they neglected to define the term "sandwich," an omission which
FALL 2008]
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would ultimately prove costly for both sides. Without an agreed definition
between the parties, the court in White City defined the term according
to its "ordinary meaning."
Attempting to discern the "ordinary meaning" of a word is a process
fraught with potential landmines of exploding possibilities. The meaning
of words cannot be separated from the society in which those words were
created; thus a word's meaning often embodies many of the beliefs, per-
ceptions, and biases of that society. In the following section, I demonstrate
the meaning of the word sandwich is not nearly as self-evident as the
court suggests. I initially set out the facts of the White City dispute, and
then explore evidence surrounding the case to suggest the term sandwich
as used in this context was ambiguous. Given that ambiguity, Judge Locke
could not properly rely on common sense and a single definition of the
term to ascribe meaning to the parties' agreement.
A. A Little Competition Never Hurt Anyone:
White City v. PR Restaurants
In March 2001, Panera-a popular chain of cafe-style restaurants
and bakeries _-signed a 10 year lease with White City Shopping Center
to occupy retail space in the White City Shopping Center in Shrewsbury,
Massachusetts.36 The lease contained an exclusive use clause preventing
the White City Shopping Center from leasing space in the same mall to
any bakery or restaurant "reasonably expected to have annual sales of
sandwiches greater than ten percent (10 %) of its total sales ... " 3The
original lease allowed for a number of exemptions to the exclusive use
provision-for example, a Jewish-style delicatessen was exempt from the
provision, and thus was free to serve sandwiches.3 8 For five years the par-
ties' dealings apparently were amicable, but before the original lease had
even expired they decided to renegotiate its terms.
The facts are silent as to why the parties determined to renegotiate
the lease early, but what becomes patently clear is that Panera sought
greater protection from competing restaurants, and the shopping center
was willing to provide that for a price. During the new round of negotia-
tions, the parties agreed to expand the exclusivity clause to cover more
35. Panera is the business name under which "PR Restaurants" operates; it has
twenty two restaurants in New Hampshire, Maine and Massachusetts alone. White City,
2006 WL 3292641, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006). See also Panera Bread,
http://www.panerabread.com/about/ (last visited June 3, 2008).
36. White City, 2006WL 3292641, at *1.
37. Brief of Defendant, supra note 11, at 2. The exclusive use clause also prohibited
the operation of luxury coffee and tea establishments such as Starbucks. Id.
38. Id.
[VOL. 14:1
Is a Burrito a Sandwich?
restaurants-the Jewish-style delicatessen lost its exemption,39 as did near-
Eastern restaurants that served gyros (a sandwich utilizing pita bread).40
But less than one year after signing the amended lease with Panera, the
White City Shopping Center entered into a lease agreement with a new
client-Qdoba Mexican Grill.4 ' Qdoba's menu features salads, tacos, que-
sadillas, and of course burritos.4 - Upon learning of the new lease, Panera
demanded assurance from the shopping center that Qdoba would not
become its neighbor. The shopping center's owner was said to be "delib-
erately evasive" and refused to provide the requested assurance;4 3 rather, it
beat Panera to the courthouse seeking a declaratory judgment that it was
not in violation of its contractual obligation.4  Thus began the now infa-
mous Burrito Brouhaha.
Despite the volley of claims, counterclaims, affidavits, and charges,
the issue before the court was deceptively simple: Does the term "sand-
wiches" as it appears in the Panera lease include burritos? 4SThe court's
response on this point consists of a single paragraph:
39. The new lease provision held that "[t]he foregoing restriction shall also apply
(Without limitation) to a ... Jewish-style delicatessen within the Shopping Center .... "
Id. at 3. Similarly, Dunkin Donuts, which had also enjoyed an exemption under the origi-
nal lease, could no longer serve sandwiches (assuming it had to begin with). Id. A number
of other restaurants, however, retained their exemption. Id. (noting that "the foregoing
restriction ... shall not apply to (i) the use of the existing, free standing building in the
Shopping Center partially occupied by Strawberries and recently expanded for a business
serving near-eastern food and related products, (ii) restaurants primarily for sit down table
service or (iii) a Papa Gino's restaurant (provided the same continues to operate with sub-
stantially the same categories of menu items as now apply to its stores and franchisees
generally).").
40. Brief of Defendant, supra note 11,at 8.
41. Anthony Miller and Robert Hauser opened the first Qdoba Mexican Grill in
Denver in 1995, and by 2003 they were popular enough to have caught the attention of
Jack in the Box. The San Diego-based company, known primarily for its burgers (and
bizarre commercials featuring a business-suit clad man wearing a grotesquely smiling,
baseball-shaped mask), operates Qdoba as a wholly-owned subsidiary. See generally Qdoba,
http://www.qdoba.com/Story.aspx?p=about (last visited June 3, 2008); Jack in the Box,
http://www.jackinthebox.com/aboutourco/index.php?section=1 (last visited June 3,
2008).
42. Brief of Defendant, supra note 11,at 3.
43. Id.
44. White City, 2006 WL 3292641, at *1. The court's ruling was in response to a
preliminary injunction motion filed by Panera seeking to enjoin the Shopping Center and
Qdoba from taking any further action. Id. Apparently, Qdoba had already spent over
$85,000 in planning and it was contractually obligated to spend over $300,000 in con-
structing a restaurant in the shopping center. Id. at *2.
45. The issue in the case also includes whether sandwiches covers tacos and que-
sadillas, but I limit my discussion to the burrito. It is only the burrito that seems to have
fired the public imagination.
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Given that the term "sandwiches" is not ambiguous and the
Lease does not provide a definition of it, this court applies the
ordinary meaning of the word. The New Webster Third Inter-
national Dictionary describes a "sandwich" as "two thin pieces
of bread, usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese,
or savory mixture) spread between them." Merriam Webster,
2002. Under this definition and as dictated by common sense,
this court finds that the term "sandwich" is not commonly
understood to include burritos ... which are typically made
with a single tortilla and stuffed with a choice filling of meat,
rice, and beans.46
Thus, the court summarily dismisses the conflict between the parties
by resort to a dictionary and common sense. Both tools ultimately present
some challenges.
The court's* reliance on a single dictionary definition at best is a
crude attempt at discerning what the parties meant. Words are slippery
entities upon which human beings struggle to place concrete meaning.47
All too often, such attempts prove difficult, and resorting to a dictionary
merely compounds the problem. For one, words do not have a singular
meaning--even in a dictionary. Not surprisingly, the same Webster's Third
New International Dictionary upon which the court relies defines
"sandwich" as follows:
Sandwich: la. two slices of bread usually buttered, with a thin
layer (as of meat, cheese, or savory mixture) spread between
them. lb. food consisting of a filling placed upon one slice or
between two or more slices of a variety of bread ...
Thus, just a half-step below the definition Judge Locke chose to adopt
was one that suggests a burrito surely is a sandwich. How then are we to
choose between these competing definitions-to break the tie of mean-
ing, so to speak? The court does so by referencing "common sense" or
some shared societal understanding of the word sandwich that transcends
46. White City, 2006 WL 3292641, at *3.
47. Justice Holmes once noted:
It is not true that in practice .. a given word or even a given collocation of
words has one meaning and no other. A word generally has several meanings,
even in the dictionary. You have to consider the sentence in which it stands
to decide which of those meanings it bears in the particular case, and very
likely you will see that it there has a shade of significance more refined than
any given in the wordbook.
Oliver Wendall Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417,417 (1899).
48. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2011 (Philip Babcock Gore
et al. eds., 1986).
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the meaning the parties themselves may have attributed to the term. The
consequence is to privilege the shopping center's definition merely be-
cause it is in line with society's own understanding and not because it is
objectively the meaning to which the parties themselves agreed. Given
that contracts are agreements between individuals-"a private affair and
not a social institution" 49--such an outcome raises some legitimacy con-
cerns. In the following section, I explore the problem of conflicting
meaning, and the available means of interpretation, in further depth.
B. Interpreting the Clause in White City
The question of interpretation in contract disputes presents some-
thing of a dilemma: Whose perspective should a judge employ in
determining what the parties agreed to bind themselves to do? Contract
doctrine divides into two schools of thought: The subjective theory of
interpretation believes a judge's role is to discern the will of the parties
based on their words and actions, while the objective theory looks to the
intention of a fictional reasonable person to determine the legal obliga-
tions of the parties. In this section, I elaborate on the centuries-long
evolution of these two schools to provide the theoretical context in
which I will examine the court's interpretation of sandwich in the White
City opinion.
1.Two Ships Without Peer, Twenty Bishops and a Partridge
in a Pear Tree: Contract Interpretation in a Nutshell
Nineteenth century judges relied on the "subjective theory," seeking
to discern the parties' intention through their words and deeds. The most
famous embodiment of subjective interpretation is the 1864 English case
of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, better known as the "Peerless" case. 0 In Peerless, a
buyer contracts with a seller to purchase and deliver several bales of cot-
ton from Bombay to England on a ship called the Peerless. As luck would
have it, there were two ships by that name-one was to arrive in England
in October, while the other would arrive in December. The contract did
not specify which "Peerless" the parties meant; the buyer believed he had
contracted for his goods to arrive on the October Peerless, while the
seller believed the agreement called for delivery on the December Peer-
less. When the buyer refused delivery of the cotton in December, arguing
breach of contract, the seller sued.
49. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943).
50. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. Div.). For an in depth
discussion of the case see A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the
Tivo Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 287 (1989).
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What is most important about Peerless is less the outcome than the
methodology. The judge sought to understand what these parties believed
they had agreed to do, and it ultimately determined they were operating
under a different set of assumptions. The English court thus ruled no con-
tract had formed between the parties because there had been "no meeting
of the minds;" there could be no basis for holding the parties to obliga-
tions they never knowingly or willingly undertook.'
But the subjective theory was to fall into disfavor. Critics charged it
was too difficult and impractical to know what was in someone's mind,
and in the laissez-faire, market-dominant economy of the nineteenth cen-
tury the uncertainties of such an exercise would jeopardize commercial
transactions and impede expansion of the marketplace. 2 Out of the ashes
of the subjective theory's demise would come the objective theory of
contract interpretation. The objective theory arrives at a determination of
contractual intent not through an evaluation of the parties' understanding,
but rather through an assessment of the intent a fictional "reasonable per-
son" would have ascribed to the terms of the contract. Judge Learned
Hand's oft-quoted pronouncement in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of
NewYork perhaps best illustrates the point:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the per-
sonal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an
obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of
the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and
represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by
twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, in-
tended something else than the usual meaning which the law
imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were
some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort."
Proponents of the theory explain its ascendance by noting that it is
practical and efficient, almost scientific in its impartiality.54 But the objec-
51. Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. at 375-6.
52. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1107, 1119 (1984) (noting the purpose of "security of transactions" is to "promote
commerce"); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870--1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 37 (1992) (noting the subjective theory undermined
the "national corporate economy").
53. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). Accord
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CAL.AMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 154 (5th ed. 2003) ("It is not
primarily the intention of the parties which the court is seeking, but the meaning of the
words at the time and place when they were used.") (quoting 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 583 (3d ed. 1960)).
54. As one scholar notes-admittedly with more than a hint of sarcasm-the objec-
tive theory:
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tive theory has its own critics. Followed to its logical conclusion, it binds
parties to an intention neither one of them held at the time of contract for-
mation ."The Restatement Second of Contracts splits the baby as it were
by adopting an approach that melds the subjective with the objective.
5 6
The starting point for interpretation is to inquire whether the parties at-
tach some special meaning to the words used in the contract; if so, that
meaning will prevail.' 7 But where both parties do not share a common
understanding, the court must engage in an additional inquiry: Where
neither party knew or had reason to know they were laboring under dif-
fering meanings, then it cannot properly be held that a "manifestation of
agreement," had formed between them.8 But if one party remains silent
despite knowing the other party holds a different meaning, a court will
not reward that act of silence. 9
Thus, contract interpretation is a subtle dance of inquiry between
the subjective and the objective. "Words and other conduct are inter-
preted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of
the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight."60 Where a term is ca-
pable of more than one interpretation, the fact finder must engage in a
search that places the term in its context and must employ extrinsic
[A]llows courts to determine the meaning of contracts without having to
determine each party's actual understanding. This view of the objective the-
ory, as a rule of common sense practicality, allows contemporary lawyers to
overlook or to reinterpret conflicting nuances in the doctrine, the two most
prominent of which are that the doctrine is reasonable, rational, and almost
self-evidently true, and that the doctrine is rigorous-even vigilant-standing
courageously firm against the wishy-washy mash that is subjective intention
or desire.
Amy Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some
Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 269, 295 (1994).
55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or CONTRACTS § 230 (noting that where two
parties enter into a contract to sell patent rights and A believes she is selling only English
rights, while B believes she is selling English, French and American rights, if a reasonably
intelligent third party believes such a sale would include English and American patents, but
not French ones, A and B would be bound to that meaning).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
57. Id. § 201(1). For example, imagine in the sale of a top-secret software program
both parties choose to refer to the program as "horse" for confidentiality purposes. If the
parties attach the same meaning to the word "horse" as used in the contract (horse = soft-
ware program), then that meaning will prevail, even though in applying the objective
theory a reasonable person would not so understand the word horse.
58. Id. § 201(2).
59. See id. § 201(3).
60. Id. § 202(1).
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evidence-that is, evidence outside the "four corners" of the agreement-
to ascribe meaning to the disputed term.61
2. Plain Meaning, Dictionaries and Common Sense
Worcester, Massachusetts, is a "plain meaning"jurisdiction.62 Like the
name suggests, such jurisdictions adopt a certain no-nonsense approach to
contract interpretation. Under the rule, "[i]f the words of the contract are
plain and free from ambiguity, they must be construed in accordance with
their ordinary and usual sense., 63 Unless the parties to the contract pro-
vided for a special definition, the meaning of a word used is to be
determined by reference to its common meaning, as reflected in diction-
ary definitions. 64 It is undisputed that the contract between Panera and
the shopping center contained no special definition of the term sandwich,
thus the "ordinary meaning" of that term applies. But what the White
City court fails to acknowledge is that sandwich is ambiguous, thus re-
quiring further inquiry into contextual and extrinsic evidence before the
term properly can be defined.
Ambiguity arises when a word is capable of more than one interpre-
61tation. Where a term is unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of
law for a judge to determine, 66 but where a term is capable of more than
one meaning, clarifying the ambiguity is a task for the fact finder.67 To
complete its task, the fact finder must read the term in context, and it may
have to resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the reasonable intention
of the parties at the time of contracting. Such extrinsic evidence includes
examining the way in which the parties performed on the contract
(course of performance); the way in which the parties performed with
each other in previous contracts, assuming they have had any (course of
61. See, e.g., Bohler-Uddeholm America, Inc. v. Ellwood Group, 247 F3d 79, 93 (3d
Cir. 2001) (noting that "a court may ... look outside the 'four corners' of a contract if the
contract's terms are unclear.")
62. See W,ite City, 2006 WL 3292641, at *3 (citing Ober v. Nat'l Casualty Co., 60
N.E.2d 90, 91 (Mass. 1945)).
63. White City, 2006 WL 3292641, at *3. The plain meaning rule is generally disfa-
vored as it can lead to harsh consequences. See e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W Thomnas
Drayage & Rigging Co,, 442 P2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968) ("The exclusion of parol evidence
regarding such circumstances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to the
reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that was
never intended."). See also PERILLO, supra note 53, § 3.10 (discussing some of the draconian
consequences of the plain meaning rule).
64. Brief of Defendant, supra note 11, at 6 (citing Town of Boylston v. Conn'r of Reve-
nue, 749 N.E.2d 684, 689 (Mass. 2001)).
65. See 11 RicARD A. LORD,WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:4 (4th ed. 2002).
66. Guilford Transp. v. Pub. Utils. Counm'n, 746 A.2d 910,914 (Me. 2000).
67. Id.
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dealing); or the way in which members of the industry would interpret a
particular term (usage of trade) .6
Linguists take exception to the notion that any word could be con-
sidered "plain and free from ambiguity"-indeed they point out the term
"ambiguity" is itself ambiguous 9
-but it is not necessary to take up that
challenge in this case. Even in plain meaning jurisdictions, once ambiguity
is discerned the fact finder must move beyond the confines of a dictionary
to clarify that ambiguity.
70
Thus the threshold question is whether the term "sandwich" is am-
biguous? Judge Locke determined without any analysis that it was not;
however, while the court relies on a single definition, as noted above The
Webster Third New International Dictionary provides at least two com-
peting plausible definitions: either a sandwich requires two slices of bread
or one or more slices." The second definition covers a variety of food
items most reasonable people would concede are sandwiches: the Scandi-
navian open-face sandwiches, which are made with just one slice of bread,
wrap sandwiches call for just one slice, and double-deckers require at least
72three slices of bread . Because the term "sandwich" has at least two
equally plausible definitions, it is ambiguous and the court cannot prop-
erly favor one definition over the other without explanation or analysis.
Judge Learned Hand once said "it is one of the surest indexes of a
mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the
dictionary[.]" 73Yet dictionaries are a time-honored tool in the judicial
toolbox, one which judges have begun to use with increasing frequency
in recent years 4. 7 But relying on a dictionary definition in isolation does
not accurately reflect the context in which the word is used, for "[w]ords
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981). Some sources of evidence
are weighed more heavily than others: Express terms are given greater weight than any
other source in determining the meaning of the parties. Id. § 203(b). But where the ex-
press term is ambiguous, course of performance is given greater weight than course of
dealing or usage of trade, and course of dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade.
Id.
69. Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 859, 859 (2004) (noting that "The problem, perhaps ironically, is that the concept
of ambiguity is itself perniciously ambiguous.").
70. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FAaNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.12 at 309 (3d ed.
2004).
71. Webster's Dictionary, supra note 48. In fact, the court acknowledges "the parties
have submitted numerous dictionary definitions for the term 'sandwich,' as well as expert
affidavits." White City, 2006 WL 3292641, at *3 n.3.
72. See supra notes 23-25.
73. Cabell v. Markham, 148 E2d 737,739 (2d Cir. 1945).
74. See Symposium, Changing Images of the State, Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and
Statutory Interpretation, 107 HAv. L. REv. 1437, 1437 (1994) (noting that the Supreme
Court has referred to dictionaries in more than six hundred cases over a period of two
centuries, and that in recent years the Court's reliance on dictionaries has reached un-
precedented levels).
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are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal
existence," and their meaning is derived only in that context." Thus,
when Judge Locke set out to interpret the term "sandwich" in the con-
tract between Panera and the White City Shopping Center, the
complexity of the question required more than a retreat to the Webster
Third New International Dictionary. While dictionaries may be a starting
point for interpretation, they cannot provide the context necessary to
properly gauge what the parties reasonably intended.7 6 And certainly
when the dictionary definition creates its own ambiguity, it is necessary to
examine extrinsic evidence to determine meaning.
Faced with a similar challenge in determining what is a chicken-
competing dictionary definitions and a volley of points and counterpoints
raised by plaintiff and defendant-Judge Friendly in Frigaliment v. BNS
International easily determined the term "chicken" was ambiguous. As a
result, extrinsic evidence, including course of performance, course of
dealing and trade usage, had to be admitted to provide context. Judge
Locke properly should have made a similar assessment. Doing so would
have yielded some relevant information: there is no evidence the parties
had previous dealings with each other, thus course of dealing is not in-
structive; similarly, the trade usage on the term "sandwiches," is conflicting
and therefore unhelpful. 8 But the past behavior of the parties in negotiat-
75. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 E2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).Judge Hand goes on to
say "and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their ag-
gregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used .... Id.
International law also calls for the ordinary meaning of a word to be read in its
context. Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose.").
76. The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, the trading system's "su-
preme court," similarly has often resorted to the use of dictionaries to determine meaning,
a process many trade experts have decried. See, e.g., Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, 1TO
Case Review 2004, 22 ARiz.J. Itr'L & COMp. L. 99, 158, 184 (2005) (Appellate Body uses
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to define "notwithstanding" and "goods"); Raj Bhala
& David A. Gantz, VITO Case Review 2004, 23 Amz. J. Irr'L & COMp. L. 107, 136, 247,
254, 318 (2006) (Appellate Body uses dictionary to define "salted," "related to," "market,"
and "sporting").
77. Frigalimnent, 190 E Supp. at 117-20.
78. Affidavit of Judith A. Quick at 2, White City Shopping Ctr. v. PR Rests., No.
2006196313, 2006 WL 3292641 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006)(asserting "[a]ccording to
the USDA definition, an ordinary closed sandwich consists of two pieces of bread (or the
top and bottom sections of a sliced roll or bun) with some kind of filling that contains
meat or poultry."). Of course by that definition, the USDA would not consider the quin-
tessentially American peanut butter and jelly sandwich to be a sandwich. Moreover, there
is more than a tinge of self-interest rolled into that definition. It turns out that ordinary
sandwiches are not subject to the USDA's jurisdiction because "they are not viewed by
consumers as products of the meat food industry or the poultry food industry." Id. Be-
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ing the amendment to the lease provides some course of performance
data that is relevant; admittedly, there is no evidence indicating exactly
what the parties meant by "sandwiches," but there is strong indication of
what the reasonable expectation of the parties were concerning the term.
Both Panera and the White City Shopping Center understood they were
negotiating for greater market protection for Panera. There could be no
other explanation as to why they were negotiating to include more res-
taurants within the exclusive use provision-that is to exclude them from
selling sandwiches-other than that Panera was seeking market protection
and the White City Shopping Center was willing to give it to them for a
price.79 The reasonable expectation of the parties gives strong guidance as
to what it is the parties intended, and thus should be given great weight.80
While the contract between Panera and the White City Shopping
Center may not explicitly have identified single-sliced sandwiches, their
inclusion is arguably implicit. They were part and parcel of what Panera
was seeking-protection from competition-and what the White City
Shopping Center was willing to negotiate away. Professor James Gordley
makes the point in his essay The Moral Foundations of Private Law:
If you enter into a contract, you explicitly want what you ex-
pressly agree upon, but if you are fair-minded, you implicitly
want whatever terms will make the deal a fair one. While you
have not thought of these terms, you would accept them if you
did and saw that they are fair.8'
But what if a party is not fair-minded? Gordley acknowledges that one
party may want to enrich herself at another's expense, "[b]ut that is an
intention the law should thwart.' 82 There is some indication of a lack of
fair-mindedness on the part of the White City Shopping Center, which if
not exactly rising to the level of bad faith, should nonetheless have been
thwarted by the law.
cause the USDA does not view burritos as sandwiches, burritos have always been subject
to the agency's, regulatory authority. Id.
79. See supra note 39. See also Jenn Abelson, Arguments Spread Thick, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 10, 2006, at Al.
80. The Restatement provides in relevant part if the "principal purpose of the par-
ties is ascertainable it is given great weight." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) or CONTRACTS
§ 202(1) (1981).
81. James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JutIs. 1, 19-20
(2002). The example Gordley uses is that of entering into a contract to purchase a car.
While you explicitly want the car itself to be delivered to you, implicitly you will want
whatever is necessary to make the car go, including a cam shaft. Even if you had never
heard of a cam shaft, you would want it as soon as you understood its relationship to the
car. Id.
82. Id. at 20.
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It appears the White City Shopping Center was well aware of the
reasonable expectation Panera would have that it was being protected
from similar competition. In a very similar lawsuit involving the shopping
center and yet another leasee, the Paper Store of Shrewsbury, the shop-
ping center once again acted in a sly manner. The Paper Store believed it
had negotiated an exclusivity clause with the shopping center that would
not allow it to lease space to a similar competing store. In the clause at
issue, the White City Shopping Center agreed:
not to "enter into (a) a lease of space in the Shopping Center
for use as a card and gift store selling primarily the kinds of
products as are currently sold in Hallmark card and gift stores
,83
or stores similar to Card Smart stores ...
Despite the clause, the White City Shopping Center went on to lease
space to a competitor selling the prohibited items; when confronted, the
mall owner responded that he would "do what's best for him and the
shopping mall" and that "he didn't believe a little competition would hurt
,,84
anyone.
In light of the evidence that "sandwich" is capable of more than one
meaning, and the reasonable expectation of the parties was that Panera
would be protected against competitors (and further evidence that in at
least one other occasion, the White City Shopping Center negotiated an
exclusivity provision it had no intention of honoring), the court's cursory
analysis seems suspect. Why did the court choose to ignore the range of
available evidence to give both meaning and context to the term "sand-
wich" as used in this contract between Panera and White City?
Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski's work on judicial decision making may
shed some light. In Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
Rachlinski and his colleagues ask the question "How do judges judge?"''
They tackle the age old-debate between the formalists and the realists as
to whether judges apply the law to the facts in a mechanical and delibera-
tive way, or whether they rely on hunches and gut feelings. What the
authors conclude is that judges generally make intuitive decisions, but
good judges subject such hunches to a second layer of analysis and will
83. Paper Store of Shrewsbury v. White City Shopping Ctr., No. 20034828, 2003
WL 23197898, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2003).
84. Id. The court in that case enjoined The Paper Store's competitor from selling
the disputed items. Id. at 2. Interestingly, the court noted the term "primarily" used in the
lease between the Paper Store and White City was ambiguous. Id. at 2-3.
85. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 1 (2007). The quote from Piero Calaman-
drei which appears in their work seems particularly apt here: "I fear the judge who is too
sure of himself, who reaches his decision quickly, jumping immediately to conclusions
without deliberation or repentance." PIERO CM.AMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES 21 (John
Clarke Adams & C.Abbott Phillips,Jr. trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1942).
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sometimes override their intuition with deliberation. 6 Intuitive decision
making can lead to accurate results, but it is more likely than the delibera-
tive process to lead judges astray; thus, melding the two processes is likely
87
to lead to a more just outcome.
Judge Locke's opinion in White City smacks of an intuitive leap; a
gut level reaction that "seems right" on its face and was not subject to a
second-layer deliberative process. This is not to say that applying the de-
liberative process would necessarily lead to a changed result-again, my
task here is not to "prove" that a burrito is a sandwich-but it would
grant greater legitimacy to the outcome. As Rachlinski and his colleagues
note, "[i]ntuition is dangerous not because people rely on it but because
they rely on it when it is inappropriate to do so."88 In this case, I argue,
resort to an intuitive leap or "'common sense" is inappropriate. It is inap-
propriate because intertwined with the 'common sense" notion that a
burrito is not a sandwich are 'certain biases-biases concerning race, class
and culture.
II. RACE, CLASS AND CULTURE IN CONTRACTS
The Legal Realists successfully made the case that law cannot be di-
vorced from society or the context from which it springs. Contracts are
particularly context-bound. In giving meaning to these private arrange-
ments between individuals, a court unabashedly looks to a common
understanding shared by society at large. Below, I identify the impact race,
class, and culture have had on the development of contract law histori-
cally. I then explore how these issues played out in the White City dispute.
A. Race
It surely surprises no one to say that race has played a central role in
the construction of American law. Examples of the linkage abound: The
"Peculiar Institution" of slavery required a series of legal accommodations
for its existence, such as the Three-Fifths Compromise, which reduced the
personhood of blacks to a fraction of that of whites. 9 During the
86. Rachlinski et. at describe their model as realistic formalism: "The model is 'real-
ist' in the sense that it recognizes the important role of the judicial hunch and 'formalist' in
the sense that it recognizes the importance of deliberation in constraining the inevitable,
but often undesirable, influence of intuition." Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & An-
drew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3
(2007).
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id.
89. During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, slavery was the central question
facing delegates. Northern delegates sought not to include slaves in any population census
of the southern states-to do so would be to award southern states with greater represen-
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Reconstruction Era, the Union's legal infrastructure was re-written in an
effort to incorporate blacks into the social fabric.9 °The Civil Rights
Movement and succeeding generations of the anti-discrimination struggle
continue efforts at using law to stamp out discrimination targeting racial
and other rmnorities.1 Each succeeding wave of race-based social justice
litigation has had significant impact on the evolution of contract law. In
this section, I explore that impact by returning to some well-known dis-
putes in the field: the racial covenant cases of the 1930s and 1940s, the
Southern legislative response to the abolition of slavery, and Williams vs.
Walker Thomas Furniture Company, the oft-discussed case on the uncon-
scionability doctrine. I then examine the role race played in White City.
tation in the House of Representatives. Southern delegates-for exactly the same reason-
wanted slaves counted fully as persons. The Three-Fifth's compromise addressed both sides'
concerns, although the section conspicuously avoids using the word slave. The Appor-
tionment of Representatives and Taxes clause provides:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this union, according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000)(parenthetical). Enforcement of the provision has
not been robust. See e.g., 8 JAMES FORD RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE
COMPROMISE OF 1850, 1-236,384-506 (Macmillan 1920); William Watson Davis, The Fed-
eral Enforcement Acts, in STUDIES IN SOUTHERn HISTORY AND POLITICS 205 (James W Garner
ed. 1914); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FED-
ERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS (Fordham Univ. Press
2005)(1985); 22 WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL AND Eco-
NOMIC, 1865-1877 (Harper & Bros. 1907); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF
SOUTHERN HISTORY (3rd ed. 2008); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION:
AI-ER THE CIVIL WAR (Vintage Books 1965).
In 1989, the Supreme Court limited the application of§ 1981, and in the words of
Professor Anthony Chase "undermined [its] purpose," Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and
Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV 1, 36 (1995), when it
held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989), that the statute ap-
plied to the formation of a contract but did not cover "conduct by the employer after the
contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or
imposition of discriminatory working conditions."
91. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v.
State of Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008);
Ruiz v. Hull, 957 p2d 984 (Ariz. 1998); Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz,
170 P.3d 183 (Alaska 2007); Harper v.Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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1.From Slavery to Freedom:
Race and Contracts in Historical Perspective
In contract law legal doctrines are heavily laced with issues of race.
Some prime examples can be found in the racial covenant cases. While
northern states generally declined to enact state-sponsored discrimination
along the model of the "Jim Crow" laws of the South,92 private contracts
with restrictive covenant clauses served a similar purpose. Racial cove-
nants prevented white homeowners from selling, leasing or conveying
their property in any manner to a member of an "excluded group".93 The
Great Migration of southern blacks from the fields to northern factories
in the early twentieth century swelled the number of black families in
northern cities, thereby creating an unprecedented need for more hous-
ing.94 The covenants became a popular tool to preserve "whites only"
neighborhoods in the face of this increasing black demand.
But where there is demand, supply invariably follows. A number of
whites breached the covenants and sold their homes to black families who
were willing to pay a premium, desperate as they were to find suitable
92. Ronald L.E Davis describes the etymology of"Jim Crow" as follows:
The term Jim Crow is believed to have originated around 1830 when a
white, minstrel show performer, Thomas "Daddy" Rice, blackened his face
with charcoal paste or burnt cork and danced a ridiculous jig while singing
the lyrics to the song, "Jump Jim Crow." Rice created this character after see-
ing (While traveling in the South) a crippled, elderly black man (or some say
a young black boy) dancing and singing a song ending with these chorus
words:
Weel about and turn about and do jis so,
Eb'ry time I weel about I jump Jim Crow.
Some historians believe that a Mr. Crow owned the slave who inspired
Rice's act-thus the reason for the Jim Crow term in the lyrics. In any case,
Rice incorporated the skit into his minstrel act, and by the 1850s the "Jim
Crow" character had become a standard part of the minstrel show scene in
America. On the eve of the Civil War, the Jim Crow idea was one of many
stereotypical images of black inferiority in the popular culture of the day.
Ronald L. F Davis, Creating Jim Crow: In-Depth Essay, http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/
history/creating2.htm (last visited June 26, 2008).
93. Leland B. Ware, Invisible Walls: An Examination of the Legal Strategy of the Restrictive
Covenant Cases, 67 WAsH. U. L. Q. 737, 740 (1989) The "excluded group" always included
blacks, and it sometimes also included Asian and Native American families, as well as reli-
gious minorities. Id. at 740 n.11.
94. The seminal work on the migration of blacks to the North continues to be
GuNNAR MYlDAL, AN AMERICAN DIEMMA (Harper & Bros. 1944); see also, Ware, supra note
93.
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accommodations. 5 These families faced lawsuits brought by whites seek-
ing judicial enforcement of their contractual right to be free of black
neighbors.The case of Corrigan v. Buckley 9 is illustrative.
In 1926, John Buckley successfully sought an injunction preventing
Irene Corrigan from selling her home to Helen Curtis, a black woman.
9 7
Buckley relied on an agreement signed by thirty white persons, including
Corrigan, "in which they recited that for their mutual benefit and the best
interests of the neighborhood ... they mutually covenanted and agreed
that no part of these properties should ever be used or occupied by, or
sold, leased or given to, any person of the negro race or blood .. .9 While
the Court declined on jurisdictional grounds to decide the case,99 it went
on to note, "It is obvious that none of these amendments [Fifth and Four-
teenth] prohibited private individuals from entering into contracts
respecting the control and disposition of their own property.. ."' The
sentiment expressed in the case could easily be read to favor Corrigan's
right to sell her home to a black woman-or to a dancing chicken for
that matter (if the price was right). But the Court used the foundational
principle of freedom of contract to privilege the earlier agreement irre-
spective of the content of that agreement." '
The Court's analysis is rooted in a classical approach to contracts,
which reveres personal autonomy and views freedom of contract as
"giv[ing] individual contracting parties all the needed leeway for shaping
the law of contracts according to their needs ... The state's role in this
95. Ware, supra note 93, at 742. Conditions in the areas reserved for black use were
so bad that one report noted racial segregation "ha[d] kept the Negro-occupied sections of
cities throughout the country fatally unwholesome places, a menace to the health, morals
and general decency of cities and plague spots for race exploitation, friction and riots." Id.
at 741 (quoting PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING AND HOME OWNERSHIP,
REPORT ON NEGRO HOUSING 45-46 (1932)).
96. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 US 323 (1926).
97. Id. at 327.
98. Id. at 327.
99. The court determined there was no state action that would call into question
possible Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment violations; thus, no substantial constitutional or
statutory question existed and it therefore had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 327-
28.
100. Id. at 330. Despite the Court's refusal to decide the case, for over two decades
after Corrigan virtually every court that heard a challenge to restrictive covenants relied on
the Corrigan dicta as governing legal authority.Ware, supra note 93, at 741.
101. Freedom of contract is so vast a legal principle that I cannot hope to even begin
pluming its depths. A short synthesis would be to say that the principle embodies the right
of individuals to enter into agreements of their own making. Private autonomy, individual
choice, and bargaining are the hallmarks of freedom of contract. Society's role would be
limited to providing mechanisms to enforce' the contract, and intervening in limited cir-
cumstances for narrow public policy considerations.
102. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Soine Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLuM. L. REV. 629,638 (1943).
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tradition is limited to ascertaining whether the parties voluntarily acceded
to the terms of the agreement.' 3 Once voluntariness is established, the
only permissible action is to enforce the will of the parties at the time of
contracting. IN Even when state intervention would result in a social
good-as in this case the establishment of a non-discriminatory society-
classical freedom of contract adopts a "hands-off" approach that "reflects a
proud spirit of individualism and of laissez faire.' '0 s
But the rugged individualist approach to contracts-even at its
high-water mark in the mid-nineteenth century-may well have been a
myth, as Professor Duncan Kennedy suggests.' No judge or legislature
has ever accepted the notion of an absolute freedom of contract; for ex-
ample, contract jurisprudence recognizes the state's role in limiting the
rights of minors, or others without full mental capacity, to bind them-
selves in contracts.17 The state also refuses to enforce contracts entered
into under duress's8or undue influence,'0 9 or in some instances where
critical information was not properly disclosed." In the race context as
well, the principle of freedom of contract is discarded when convenient.
Professor Jennifer Roback explains that under the Southern wage labor
system, which developed with the demise of slavery, "[e]xploitation was
not inherent in the capitalist system; rather, government power had to be
specifically mobilized to achieve this end."' The government power she
identified was a series of laws that aided southern planters in establishing a
labor market cartel that effectively limited the right of blacks and whites
to freely enter into contracts. One of the basic types of legislation that
made this possible was the contract enforcement and enticement laws.
Contract-enforcement laws prevented black farm workers from breaching
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 630.
106. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563,579
(1982) (noting "I don't think one could show that the economy was any less "interde-
pendent," commodities any less "complex," or people. are more "individualist" in the early
than in the late nineteenth or mid-twentieth century.") Id.
107. See, RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) Or CONTRACTS § 12 (1981) ("No one can be
bound by contract who has not legal capacity to incur at least voidable contractual du-
ties.") This principle has been used to allow minors, among others, to disaffirm contracts
that are not for "necessaries". See Halbmnan v. Lemike, 298 N.W2d 562, 564 (Wis. 1980)
(noting the purpose of the infancy doctrine is to "[p]rotecto ... minors from foolishly
squandering their wealth through improvident contracts with crafty adults who would
take advantage of them in the marketplace.").
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981).
109. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §177 (1981).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
111. Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor L.w in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Comnpeti-
tive? 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1984).
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employment contracts: "[A] laborer who signed a contract and then aban-
doned his job could be arrested for a criminal offense. Ultimately his
choice was simple: he could either work out his contract or go to the
chain gang.'""'2 Enticement laws were directed at white planters and
sought to prevent them from competing among themselves for black la-
bor by subjecting to criminal sanctions employers who "enticed" away a
worker already under contract to another.'
13
What contract principles constructed, however, they also worked to
dismantle. Before Shelly v. Kraemer, in which the Supreme Court
ultimately banned racial covenants on principles transcending freedom of
contract,"4 some courts declined to enforce them based on principles of
contract law. For example, in Hundley v. Gorewitz, the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit denied enforcement of a restrictive covenant based on
the doctrine of changed circumstances."' "Changed circumstances" is a
contractual doctrine based on economic principles." 6 While the classical
notion of pacta sunt servanda (pacts must be respected) calls for perform-
ance no matter the circumstances, "' the doctrine of changed
circumstances excuses performance in certain instances when it "can only
be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost."'" 8
Bluntly stated, the court in Hundley concluded blacks had so thor-
oughly infiltrated the area that plaintiff could not hope to attain his vision
of a segregated neighborhood:
[T]he present appellees are not now enjoying the advantages
which the covenant sought to confer. The obvious purpose
was to keep the neighborhood white. But the strict enforce-
ment of all five covenants will not alter the fact that the
purpose has been essentially defeated by the presence of a Ne-
112. Id. at 1166 (quoting PETE . DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE
SouTH, 1901-1969, at 25 (1972)).
113. Roback, supra note 111,at 1166.
114. In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1948), the Supreme Court determined
judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants based on race constituted state action, and
were thus a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment ("It is
clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply
of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question
without restraint ... ").
115. See Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
116. "Changed circumstances" is a general principle encompassing impossibility or
impracticability of performance, as well as frustration of purpose-applicable here. See
generally PERILLO, supra note 53, § 13.1-13.12.
117. Id. at 513.
118. Transatlantic Fin. Co. v. U.S., 363 F2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting "It is
now recognized that 'A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practica-
ble; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and
unreasonable cost.'") (quoting Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 460 (Cal.
1916)); See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
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gro family now living in an unrestricted house in the midst of
the restricted group, and as well by the ownership by another
Negro of a house almost directly across the street. And this is
just the beginning.
The trend is unmistakable, its effect is apparent, and we are
brought to conclude that to grant an injunction enforcing the
covenant would merely depreciate all the property in the block
without accomplishing the purpose which originally impelled
its making, while to deny an injunction will leave all of the
properties with a value commensurate to the conditions as
they now exist." 9
In setting forth the applicable rule in Hundley, the court's focus was
not on the rights of the black purchaser but on the economic effect of
any decision on the white seller and white homeowners in the neighbor-
hood. In short, the court focused on an analysis of economic waste-
whether enforcing the contract would produce greater or lesser economic
benefits-rather than on social justice.2 °The economic impact on black
families went unnoticed. Black families faced economic challenges
whether or not a covenant was enforced. In Hundley, for example, Freder-
ick and Mary Hundley purchased and lived in the home for one year
before the lower court cancelled their deed and permanently enjoined
them from ever "owning, occupying, selling, leasing, transferring or con-
veying" the property.'21 The Hundley's losses from the sale, moving and
relocation costs did not figure in the court's analysis.
2
119. Hundley, 132 E2d at 25.
120. The court notes:
This exception to the rule [the doctrine of changed circumstances] is appli-
cable in the case of a covenant such as we have here when, in the natural
growth of a city, property originally constructed for residential purposes is
abandoned for homes of more modern construction in more desirable loca-
tions, for a serious decline in values would follow unless the way was open
either for use of the property for business purposes or for the housing needs
of a lower income class. And it is also applicable where removals are caused
by constant penetration into white neighborhoods of colored persons. For in
such cases to enforce the restriction would be to create an unnatural barrier
to civic development and thereby to establish a virtually uninhabitable sec-
tion of the city. Whenever, therefore, it is shown that the purpose of the
restriction has been frustrated and that the result of enforcing it is to depreci-
ate rather than to enhance the value of the property concerned, a court of
equity ought not to interfere.
Hundley 132 E2d at 24.
121. Id. at 24-25.
122. Even when they were allowed to move into a predominately white neighbor-
hood, blacks suffered economic loss in the face of white flight and falling property values.
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It seems no discussion of race and contracts is complete without a
reflection on Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Company.113 But any dis-
cussion of that case is fraught with potential landmines littered with the
debris of unexamined stereotypes and unexplored chchs).'1 4 Williams
evokes some of the most prevalent stereotypes of black women as fertile,
unmarried "Welfare Queens."'125 Professor Muriel Morisey Spence identi-
Id. In The Roosters Egg: On the Persistence of Race, Professor Patricia Williams recounts her
experience of "[t]he mass movement that turned my neighborhood into an 'inner city'
I remember when I was a little girl in the late 1950s, two or three black
families moved into our neighborhood where for fifty years my mother's
family had been the only blacks. I remember the father of my best friend,
Cathy, going from house to house, warning the neighbors, like Paul Revere
with Chicken Little's brain, that the property values were falling, the values
were falling. The area changed overnight. Whites who had seen me born and
baked me cookies at Halloween and grown up with my mother now fled for
their lives.
PATRICIA J.WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG 35 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
123. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Wil-
liams is part of the canon of contract cases and a perennial favorite in critical scholarship
on race. See e.g., Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability Do to the
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company? 34 CONN. L. REv. 625, (2002); Amy Kastely, Out of the
hiteness: On Raced Codes and hite Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract
Law, 63 U. CIN. L. R-Ev. 269 (1994); Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation
of Bargains: Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance Of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv.
925 (2006); Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3
TEMP. PoL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89 (1994); Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper
Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Con-
tracting Process, 62 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 183 (1994).
124. In her book The Rooster's Egg, Professor Patricia Williams takes on some of the
stereotypes ascribed to poor. "[T]he premises of the mean-spirited welfare war against
today's impoverished have grown into industrial-strength cliches, beginning with the one
that welfare recipients are oversexed single women who just want to have fun by making
babies so they can support themselves on grotesquely huge welfare checks." WILLIAMS,
supra note 122, at 7. She quotes a welfare official as stating "Every time I see a bag lady on
the street, I wonder, 'Was that an A.FD.C mother who hit the menopause wall-who can
no longer reproduce and get money to support herself?'" Id. at 6.
125. The term "Welfare Queen" was popularized by Ronald Reagan during the
1976 presidential campaign. DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN: A PULITZER
PRIZE-WINNING JOURNALIST'S PORTRAIT OF WOMEN ON THE LINE 65 (1997). See also "Welfare
Queen" Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976, at 51. Although he
never gave her name--nor her race for that matter-Reagan reputedly was referring to
Linda Taylor, a Chicago woman charged with using four aliases and defrauding the state of
$8,000. The "Welfare Queen" image Reagan invoked turned out to be a myth, but it is
one slow to die in the American psyche. See, e.g., id. ("The 'welfare queen' item in Mr.
Reagan's repertoire is one of several that seem to be at odds with the facts.").
If there were any Cadillac-driving, champagne-sipping, penthouse-living
welfare queens in North Philadelphia, I didn't find them. What I found in-
stead was a thriving subculture of destitute women, abandoned by their men
[VOL. 14:1
Is a Burrito a Sandwich?
fies the competing faces of Williams when she notes, "Williams has the
relatively rare feature of a plaintiff in a civil suit who is not middle-
class.... The facts and the way they inform the decision invite us to con-
sider how the law may be used as a tool to protect the unprotected.' '12 6 In
other words, Williams presents a teachable moment. It is a case that allows
professors willing to stray into the uncomfortable the opportunity to re-
move the mask of race-neutrality that doctrinal courses like contracts too
often hide behind. But as Professor Spence also acknowledges, the case
raises troubling possibilities for further perpetuation of the stereotypes
that society, and consequently our students, already hold. 127 Spence ulti-
mately concludes, Williams "is well worth teaching.' ', 2 Similarly, while
recognizing the risk of perpetuating stereotypes, I too believe Williams is
useful in illustrating the way not only race, but also class and culture effect
law. I therefore choose to use it, while gingerly walking around the land-
mines.
The appellant in Williams-a poor, black, mother of seven, separated
from her husband, and dependent on welfare-purchased a number of
items on credit from the Walker Thomas Furniture Company.1 29 After
more than four years of steady repayment, having paid off $1,400 of the
$1,700 balance, Williams defaulted on the loan. 1 30 The Company invoked
its security interest under a clause in the contract allowing it to repossess
all the items Williams had purchased. The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit denied enforcement of the contract, concluding the security
clause was unconscionable. 13
and left to fend for themselves and their children, with welfare and food
stamps their only dependable source of income.
See also, ZUccHINO, supra, at 13-14.
126. Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEv.
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 89, 102 (1994).
127. Id. at 103 (acknowledging her "fear that in our longing to see people of color in
the law school curriculum we grasp rather desperately at any opportunity to discuss them,
overlooking or ignoring the potential for reinforcing stereotypes.").
128. Id.
129. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The
most (in)famous of Ms. Williams' purchases was an Admiralty stereophonic radio; over the
course of five years, items on the Williams' shopping list included "two pairs of draperies at
a cost of $12.95 ... one wallet, one apron set, on pot holder set, one set of rugs, one more
pair of draperies, one 2 x 6 foot folding bed, one chest, one 9 x 12 foot linoleum rug, two
pairs of curtains, four sheets, one WS20 portable fan, two more pairs of curtains, one
Royal portable typewriter, two gun and holster sets (presumably toys), one metal bed, one
inner spring mattress, four chrome kitchen chairs, one bath mat set, shower curtains, one
Speed Queen washing machine . Eben Colby, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionabil-
ity Do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 625,647 (2002).
130. Williams, 350 E2d at 447.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 205-207.
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Interestingly, of the five descriptors I used above to identify Ms. Wil-
liams, only one of them was omitted from the court's opinion-that Ora
Lee Williams was black.'3 2 While much has been made of race and the
Williams case, 133 the opinion itself remains conspicuously silent on the
matter. Race is the two thousand pound elephant in the room, trumpet-
ing stridently while the court pretends to ignore it.' 34 Why would almost
everything about Ms. Williams be fair game for judicial scrutiny, from her
marital status, to the number of family members, to the size of her welfare
check-$21.8 a month'3s-but not her race?
One benign explanation might be that race simply is irrelevant to a
determination of the case, while the other descriptors perhaps evidenced
Ms. Williams' lack of bargaining power relative to the furniture company,
a principle that forms the foundation for the court's decision. In other
words, one might argue the other descriptors of Ms. Williams support the
court's finding that she was the weaker party in the transaction, and the
furniture company took advantage of its position to force her assent to
terms so unfair no reasonable person would agree to them absent coer-
cion. 13 6 But could race not be yet another factor allowing the company to
take advantage of Ms.Williams?
132. See Willams, 350 E2d at 445. Despite the court's omission, research has shown
that indeed Williams was black. See e.g., Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Dispar-
ity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 889,926 n.208 (1997) (noting that
a colleague had verified Ms. Williams' race).
133. See, e.g., Kastely, supra note 123, at 269. See also Morant, supra note 132.
134. See, e.g., Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Com-
mon-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 183, 205 (1994) ("There can be no doubt that concerns about racism per-
colate beneath the surfacefl of Williams ... although the courtf ... [was] confined to
dealing with symptoms of that disease (substantive and procedural unconscionability)
rather than directly confronting the disease itself.").
135. Williams, 350 E2d at 448.
136. A third explanation might be the belief among some whites that referencing
race is itself racist. Race "neutrality"--and absence of all indicia of race-for some repre-
sents the height of equality. As Margaret Mahoney notes, this attempt at color evasion rests
on a perception of the inferiority of the "Other":
Color and power evasion are pervasive in public discourse in the United
States. When whites are color evasive, they fail to notice their own color, the
color of others, and any difference between them. Color evasion treats notic-
ing color or race as a manifestation of prejudice. Although color evasion
seems to many white Americans hke courtesy, the idea that noticing race is
itself prejudiced rests on a fundamental sense that race involves the inferior-
ity of the "Other." White privilege is the product of a social history of radical
power and subordination. Adopted in an effort to avoid being racist, color
evasion implicitly preserves values drawn from essentialist racism.
Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-
Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 808-09 (2003).
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Professor Blake Morant argues it is reasonable to assume knowledge
of Ms. Williams' race "and any negative stereotypes and prejudices associ-
ated thereto, [which] also may have contributed to the company's decision
to tender the burdensome installment contract. 137 If true, ignoring the
impact of race on Williams' bargaining power limits the court's ability to
fully redress the grievance. The court's willful blindness to the impact of
race-color blindness-allows the furniture company to continue target-
ing others in Ms. Williams' position. 138 Colorblindness thus adversely
impacts blacks, and the antidote requires a consciousness on the part of
blacks and whites of the role of race in law:
139
[C]olorblindness seeks to deny the continued social signifi-
cance of the category, to tell blacks that they are no different
from whites, even though blacks as blacks are persistently
made to feel that difference. Color consciousness allows for
recognition of the distinct and difficult difference that race has
137. Morant, supra note 132, at 929. Professor Amy Kastely argues that in failing to
acknowledge race, the court leaves readers with a vague sense of Ms. Williams' incompe-
tence and need for charity from honorable people. Kastely, supra note 123, at 306. Indeed,
Kastely argues, the court's decision invites readers to focus on race-charged proxies such as
lack of education and single parenthood rather than on racism and predatory pricing con-
siderations:
By failing to include further detail about the contracts between Walker-
Thomas and Williams and by resting instead on the vague and broadly asso-
ciated listing of limited power, little knowledge, limited education, and lack
of choice, Judge Wright's opinion allows-even invites-the reader to use
raced tropes linking poverty, lack of education, single parenthood, and lack of
capacity with black women and to disregard the connection between white
racism and exploitative pricing and collection practices.
Kastely, supra note 123, at 306.
138. Apparently, that is exactly what the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company did. See
Colby, supra note 123 (noting that in the ten years prior to Williams, the furniture com-
pany sought writs of replevin against approximately one thousand people. After Williams,
the company pursued customers in default with even greater vigor. The only change was
that sued customers for the balance of the contract rather than seeking writs of replevin.).
Id. at 657.
139. Kastely notes:
By failing to ... even name Williams' race, Judge Wright's opinion leaves
readers with nothing but the vague sense that Williams, a black woman re-
ceiving welfare, was incompetent and in need of charity from honorable
people, a sense given form and credibility only because of its correspondence
with racist stereotypes of black women.
Kastely, supra note 123, at 307.
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made; it facilitates white awareness of the efforts of African
Americans to describe and examine that difference.14
2. Does a Burrito have a Race?
"I know of no chef or culinary historian who would call a burrito a
sandwich. Indeed, the notion would be absurd to any credible chef or
culinary historian," 141 said Christopher Schlesinger, celebrated New
England chef and affiant in the White City dispute. Schlesinger's view that
the two food items could never be considered part of the same genus
comes down to a question of lineage: "A sandwich is of European roots,"
he asserts, while "a burrito, on the other hand, is specific to Mexico."'
2
Such a categorical statement raises immediate suspicion: Is a New
Orleans Po' Boy4 not a sandwich merely because it is of American rather
than European origin? And if the American variety is capable of evolving
into a bona fide sandwich-despite its ancestry-than why not the bur-
rito? For many, however, the notion that burritos are not sandwiches is
self-evident. But as I've argued above, embedded in that perspective are
certain unconscious notions of race. Acknowledged or not, burritos are
perceived to have a racial status, that of Mexicans; sandwiches are per-
ceived as white.
Admittedly, the most difficult aspect to this discussion is ascribing
race to an inanimate object like a burrito. Is this simply taking anthropo-
morphism too far? Somehow, assigning a certain class or cultural status to
an object does not seem to raise the same challenge. The Lamborghini is
easily identified as an upper class toy, and a bottle of champagne is syn-
onymous with French culture. But can a burrito be said to have a race?
And if so, does Mexican qualify?
Categorizing Mexicans within the U.S. racial framework is a com-
plex task. The first question one confronts-whether Mexican constitutes
a race-calls for multiple responses. Sociologists have claimed Mexican as
140. Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 52 (1995) (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1087 (1991)).
141. Schlesinger Affidavit 2.
142. Id. 3-4.
143. A Po' Boy, also known as an Oyster Loaf, is a sandwich from New Orleans made
with French bread and filled with fried oysters, shrimp, fish, soft-shelled crabs, crawfish,
roast beef and gravy, roast pork, meatballs, or smoked sausage. They are served either
"dressed" (usually with mayonnaise, lettuce and tomatoes) or "undressed" (plain). Linda
Stradley, History of Hoagies, Submarine Sandwiches, Po' Boys Sandwiches, Dagwood Sandwiches
and Italian Sandwiches, WHAT's COOKING AM ERCA, 2004, http://whatscookingamerica.net/
History/HoagieSubmarinePoBoy.htm.
[VOL. 14:1
Is a Burrito a Sandwich?
an ethnicity rather than a race, '4 4 but this only begs the question. In race-
conscious America, ethnicity and race are inextricably linked. As one
scholar notes, "the illness of racism still confuses just about everything--so
much that you can't even begin to talk about ethnicity without having to
place almost primary emphasis on the underlying question of race.
' '
4
Professor Laura Gomez, in her recent book Manifest Destinies: The Making
of the Mexican American Race, suggests the designation of Mexican as an
ethnicity is a "misconception. 46 She maintains that "[r]acial categories
and racial differences are socially constructed; rather than having inherent
significance, race is historically contingent and given meaning by persons,
institutions, and social processes: '1 4 7 In essence, Mexican is a race because
American society makes it so.
The second question one inevitably confronts in a discussion of race
and Mexicans is this: If Mexican is a race are Mexicans black or white?'48
In what has been termed "the Black/White binary of race, 49 American
society largely recognizes exclusively those two races despite the rapid
144. See, e.g., Rachel F Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 61, 70
n.27 (1997) ("The view of Latinos as an ethnic, rather than a racial, group is consistent
with their treatment on the United States Census," which indicates that Latinos can be of
any race.); See also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DIRECTIVE No. 15, RACE AND ETHNIC
STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS, 43 Fed. Reg. 19260
(1977).
Of course the term ethnicity is fraught with its own problems. One author con-
tends that "[e]thnicity is treated like a kind of disease." Ishmael Reed et al., Is Ethnicity
Obsolete?, in THE INVENTION OF ETHNICITY 226, 228 (Werner Sollors ed., 1989).
145. Reed, supra note 144, at 231. See also LAURA GOMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE
MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE 2 (2007) ("Race and ethnicity overlap in im-
portant ways-and in fact race as it operates in the United States generally subsumes
ethnicity").
146. GOMEZ, supra note 145, at 1.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Gomez relates a poignant story regarding her own ten year old son who one
day asked the big question-"Mom, are we white?":
I asked him to tell me more about what he was interested in finding out.
"Well, back when there was slavery, were Mexicans white or black?" I began
my answer by saying the question was complicated and one that people dis-
agreed about. I told him that Mexican Americans had ancestors who were
Indian, African, and Spanish, but they were primarily indigenous. I said that I
did not believe we were white He responded with another question-
"Then why don't we say whites, blacks, and browns?"-and then was
quickly off to get ready for school.
Id. at 149.
149. See RicHARD DELGADO, The Black!/White Binary: How Does It Work?, in THE LA-
TINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER 369-75 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
1998).
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increase in Latino and Asian populations.' However American courts
have had to grapple with the racial status of Mexicans in society. In the
seminal 1897 case of In re Rodriguez, a federal court confronted the ques-
tion outright.'5 ' The issue before the court was whether Mr. Rodriguez-
a citizen of Mexico-could be naturalized as an American given that "he
is not a white person, nor an African, nor of African descent."' '2 While the
court concluded Mr. Rodriguez was "lamentably ignorant" and that his
"untrained mind [was] deficient in the power to elucidate or define the
principles of the constitution"-one of the requirements for citizenship--
it nevertheless concluded he was eligible for naturalization: "[W]hatever
may be the status of the applicant viewed solely from the standpoint of
the ethnologist, he is embraced within the spirit and intent of our laws
upon naturalization ... .,s The result of In re Rodriguez was an implicit
determination that Mr. Rodriguez was "white enough," at least for pur-
poses of U.S. naturalization law. Professor Gomez labels this constrained
grant of whiteness as "off-white"-Mexicans are sometimes considered
legally white but socially are always considered non-white.
Assuming Mexican is a race-although it is admittedly difficult to
locate in a strictly black/white racial paradigm-the question still remains:
Is there really a link between race and burritos? Interestingly, the ordinary
citizen on the web had little difficulty making the connection. Shortly
after the White City opinion was announced, bloggers set to work provid-
ing social commentary in a way that would have given Nina Totenberg a
run for her money.54 One blogger "pull[ed] out the race card" in ques-
tioning the cultural (and culinary) imperialism of the decision:
OK I guess I am going to ... pull out the race card here....
This is kind of offensive here. OK if burritos are found in
northern Mexico. Why didn't they get a Mexican to say "no,
that is not a sandwich"? [sic] If they did the case would have
been settled easily .... I am not saying this to be racist (so if
150. See Moran, supra note 132, at 61 ("In 1960, when the modern civil rights
movement was in its ascendancy, Whites accounted for almost 90% of the population, and
Blacks represented nearly 10%. Latinos and Asian Americans combined amounted to only
about 5% of the total population. Not surprisingly, race relations were largely defined in
Black-White terms").
151. In re Rodriguez, 81 E 337,348 (WD. Tex. 1897). 1 gratefully acknowledge Pro-
fessor Gomez's discussion of the case, which provides the background for my own analysis.
152. Id. at 337. Of course, as the court noted, Mexicans had been collectively natu-
ralized under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Id. at 339,350-51.
153. Id. at 354-55.
154. Nina Totenberg is a legal reporter with National Public Radio who often com-
ments on Supreme Court cases. For Totenberg's biography, see National Public Radio,
Nina Totenberg, NPR Biography, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld
=2101289 (last visited May 28, 2008).
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you're white, please don't take offense) but why does this gov-
ernment and media use white people to define Mexican
culture and food?'5'
In another entry, a blogger cast the shadow of the affirmative action de-
bate over burritos asking, "Doesn't anyone know the difference between
'legislative' and 'judicial?'" then stating, "If it had been legislative, a) it
wouldn't be called the White City Shopping Center, and b) diversity
foods would be given preference in any case.',
15 6
And in an even more crude allusion to race, another blog entry
asked, "At what moment then, does a burrito become a burrito? When it
sneaks across the border in a closed-up box trailer towed by a big rig, then
is abandoned, while locked still inside, in the desert without food, water,
ventilation or Xbox. '" 137
What is illuminating about the blog commentary is that it does
identify race as an issue; but only the burrito is assumed to have a race.
The sandwich is considered race neutral. I maintain a similar dynamic
exists in the Mhite City opinion.
So, how did the race of burritos affect decision making in White
City? Race played a significant but silent role in the proceedings. It pro-
vided the unspoken gloss that lent legitimacy to the decision, despite the
fact that Judge Locke's opinion evidenced a gut-level intuitive reaction
rather than the reasoned analysis necessary to resolve this complex issue.
As noted above, because the parties failed to incorporate a special mean-
ing of the term sandwich into their agreement, the court properly looked
to the ordinary meaning society generally imparts on the term. Based on
the public reaction when the court's decision was announced, the opinion
captured the shared understanding of many. The public response to the
White City decision was an overwhelming "duh!" As one blogger put it,
the distinction between the two items was so self-evident that "the judge
could have deferred to the true experts that were not called ... [a]ny 12-
year old-kid.""" This chorus of agreement begs further reflection. Is the
distinction between burritos and sandwiches really so self-evident that no
further analysis is required?
I have already argued the term sandwich is ambiguous, thus the
court properly should have examined the context of the
155. Posting of Cameltoes to Obscure Store and Reading Room, http://
obscurestore.typepad.com/obscure-store_andreading/2006/11/judgerules-tha.html
(Nov. 10, 2006,7:59:12 AM).
156. Postings of Pete R. & Dan Collins to Protein Wisdom, http://
www.proteinwisdom.com/?p=7677 (Nov. 13, 2006, 11:08 PM & 11:18 PM).
157. Posting of McGehee to Protein Wisdom, http://www.proteinwisdom.com/
?p=7677 (Nov. 13, 2006, 10:35 PM).
158. Squawkbox Noise, http://squawkboxnoise.wordpress.com/2006/11/11/i-am-
glad-we-cleared-that-up/ (Nov. 11,2006,10:52 AM).
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agreement-beyond mere dictionaries-to clarify the ambiguity. In addi-
tion to words, the court might well have looked to additional sources of
information. I digress from contract law for a moment to borrow from
international trade law. I find it helpful in order to illustrate my broader
point that what the court has deemed self-evident is actually a complex
legal question.
Trade dispute panels are often tasked with determining whether one
product is "like" another.5 9 In so doing, they examine not only the tariff
heading countries have assigned to a particular product (Which would be
equivalent to a dictionary definition in this context), but they also look to
the function and purpose the two products serve in order to determine
whether they are "like" one another.' 60 Similarly, the court might well
have looked to the function and purpose sandwiches and burritos serve in
order to determine whether burritos are sandwiches-or at least their
functional equivalent.
Despite their distinct origins-the sandwich was invented by no less
venerable a personality than an English Earl, while the burrito was created
to feed and strengthen Mexican gold miners' 61-burritos and sandwiches
serve the same function and purpose. Of course, they are meant to be
eaten, but more specifically, both fall within the same category of "fast
casual" food.' 62 They are generally cheap, quick, and do not require an
elaborate dining set up. In short, burritos and sandwiches serve the same
purpose, fall within the same niche market, and cater to the same clien-
tele. Yet they are perceived as completely different products. Interestingly,
the wrap sandwich-despite its similarity to burritos-does not face the
159. Under Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a treaty signa-
tory may not discriminate between "like products" based on country of origin. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. pt. 5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT]. In other words, if the United States imposes a tax of 5% on cocoa from Ivory
Coast, it must provide the same tax treatment to cocoa from Belgium. The more difficult
question is must the United States provide the same treatment for raw cocoa from Ivory
Coast and chocolate bars from Belgium? To answer the question, a trade dispute panel
would analyze whether cocoa and chocolate bars are "like products"-and it would look,
among other things, to the function and purpose of the two products.
160. Professor Robert Hudec notes that "'likeness' generally indicates that two prod-
ucts are competitive, and ... that the relative degree of competitiveness between two
products will determine the economic effects that differential treatment will have upon
the less favored product." Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regula-
tion: Requiem for an "A in, and Effects"Test, 32 ltrr't LAw. 619, 626 (1998).
161. See infra text accompanying notes 190-205.
162. "Fast casual" dining is the latest trend for consumers who do not want fill table
service but prefer higher-quality food and a dining experience a step above "fast food".
See, e.g., Wikipedia.org, List of fast casual restaurants, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Fast-casual (last visited May 28, 2008).
The trend incorporates many culinary choices, including sandwich, Asian, Mexican
and hamburger eateries. Devlin Smith, Fast-casual, ENTREPRENEUR, Dec. 2003, http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mODTI/is-1231/ai_111163625.
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same perception difficulties; few would argue that a wrap is not a sand-
wich.
Given the ambiguity in meaning of the term sandwich, as well as
the shared function and purpose burritos and sandwiches serve, why did
Chef Schlessinger, the court, and popular opinion all converge around the
notion that burritos clearly are not sandwiches? Why do so many see the
distinction as self-evident? Critical theorists have shown one of the great-
est dangers in challenging majority norms is that they seem so ... well,
normal, self-evident, unassailably true. 163 They have effectively demon-
strated that the "duh!" response is nothing more than a single frame of
reference within which to explore a question; but because that single
frame represents the view of the majority, it dominates legal culture such
that even calling it into question raises questions of triviality, banality or
obviousness. 164 Strangely enough, a band-aid and a crayon serve to illus-
trate the point.
In The Flesh-Colored Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue and
Norms, Patricia Tidwell and Peter Linzer note "(]or years we 'understood'
what a flesh-colored band-aid was-until black people pointed out that
163. Professor Patricia Williams, famed proponent of critical race theory, recalls a
television program she watched in which black students from inner-city schools were
asked to refute statistics showing the lack of educational opportunities available to them.
Williams writes:
It was unbearable listening to these young people try to answer this question.
It put them in an impossible double bind. On the one hand, the invisible
norm was the "average" (achieving) white middle-class ideal; although this
was never articulated, this is what they had to prove themselves the same as.
On the other hand, these were lower class kids who came from tough inner-
city neighborhoods where very few of their friends could realistically enter-
tain aspirations to become neurosurgeons or microbiologists. It was this
community from which they were being cued to be different .... I am not
faulting these young people's aspirations or goals. What concerns me is the
way in which not just this commentator, but also society at large forces them
and others like them to reconcile their successfil status with a covert cultural
standard.
Patricia J. Williams, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times,
104 H~alv. L. R.v. 525,531 (1990).
See also Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid-Contracts,
Feminism, Dialogue and Nornis, 28 Hous. L. REv. 791, 794 (1991) ("What we see as obvi-
ous-often so obvious that we really give it no thought-may be only one of many ways
of looking at things, but a way that has dominated our legal culture for many years.").
164. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HAv. L. REV. 10, 68 (1987)
(noting that "[p]ower is at its peak when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences, ar-
ranges agendas, and excludes serious challenges from discussion or even imagination"). See
also Tidwell & Linzer, supra note 163, at 801-02 (noting that "because the power of nam-
ing is an invisible power, challenging it often exposes the challenger to scorn and
accusations of triviality").
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their skin was not pinkish-beige."' 6' Like the band-aid, peach-colored
crayons were self-evidently "flesh-colored," until Crayola decided to
change the name in 1962. 66 Before the name change, peach-hued crayons
and peach colored band-aids were incontrovertibly and self-evidently
"flesh-colored"; both common sense and a twelve-year-old child could
have told you as much. It was only when some developed eyes enough to
see and ears enough to hear that the unconscious biases embedded in the
name "flesh" could be revealed.'67
Apex Hides the Hurt, a novel by Colson Whitehead, makes a similar
point. The protagonist in Apex is a nomenclature consultant-a man paid
to name things "so that they sound catchy"' 68-who is charged with cre-
ating an ad campaign for flesh-colored band-aids:
The man walked around the conference room table, provoking
the good men in their good suits to reconsider the basic laws
of their profession. Band-Aids are flesh-colored, the man said.
Most adhesive bandages are flesh-colored. Are advertised as
such. And it did not occur to anyone to ask, whose flesh is this?
It ain't mine, and with that the man pulls back one sleeve to
reveal his wrist, and the skin there.'69
With this single revelatory act, the man in the conference room rips the
veil of silence to expose the complexity that lies underneath. What had
long been held as self-evidently true was demonstrably false. It was all a
question of perspective.
165. Tidwell & Linzer, supra note 163, at 817.
166. On its Website detailing crayon chronology, Crayola® says "peach" was changed
from "flesh" in 1962, "partially" as a result of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. "Indian
Red" was renamed Chestnut in 1999 in response to educators who felt some children
wrongly perceived the crayon color was intended to represent the skin color of Native
Americans. The name originated from a reddish-brown pigment found near India com-
monly used in fine artist oil paint. Crayola Creativity Centralm, Color Corner,
http://www.crayola.com/colorcensus/history/chronology.cfn (last visited May 28, 2008).
167. Crayola® now sells the "Crayola® Multicultural Marker Classpack®," which
includes 10 markers each of: golden beige, beige, tan, tawny, bronze, terra cotta, mahogany
and sienna, as well as a lesson plan. The Crayola Store.com, http://www.crayolastore.com/
product-detail.asp?T1 =CRA+58%2D8217& (last visited June 4, 2008).
168. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 22. In real life, finding just the right name for things
has become a big problem for brands with a global reach; a recent New York Times article
acknowledged the difficulty: "Before it used to be like climbing a hill. Now, it's like cross-
ing the Himalayas." Kate Weisman, In a Global Marketplace, Claiming a Name Becomes an Art
In Itself N.Y TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
03/08/business/media/08adco.html.
169. WHImTEHEAD, supra note 2, at 88.
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B. Class
The role of class in the unfolding drama of American law is not as
obvious as race. Whereas race is immutable, 170 even the existence of class
distinctions is hotly contested: "American society presents the enigma that
despite great differentials in wealth, prestige and power, there are no
clearly marked social classes."' 17' The myth of a classless society holds great
sway with Americans; there is a true yearning to believe a person's meas-
ure is determined by her character not her bank account, and the ability
to rise out of the rankest poverty is constrained only by one's willingness
to engage in "hard work" The following section explores the role class
plays in contract jurisprudence, and then examines the impact of class in
White City.
1. On the Existence of Class in Contracts and Society
In America, class is taboo.7 2 Why? To acknowledge the existence of a
class is to acknowledge the existence of "a structured system of economic
inequality ... that tends to reproduce itself over time, and that is not
changed by the mere fact that some individuals are mobile within it.
'17
1
Class is taboo because its existence runs counter to the myth of the
American Dream. Despite the numerical impossibility, most Americans
see themselves as "middle class" with fairly limitless possibilities for
170. In law, however, nothing ever is quite as simple as it seems. There is the question
of mixed races. See Angela Onwuachi-Wifig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REv. 873 (2006).
But see GOMEZ, supra note 145, at 147. Professor Gomez notes that:
American racial dynamics were and are often seen as the mirror opposite of
Latin American race relations .... While Spanish-Mexican categories are
viewed as flexible, American categories are viewed as historically fixed. In re-
ality, the Spanish-Mexican system regularly produced racial dynamics that
were harder than they appeared to be, while the Anglo-American system
regularly produced dynamics that were more malleable than they appeared to
be.
Id. She goes on to note, however, that "the United States actually includes both models of
race relations." Id.
171. Walter Goldschmidt, Social Class in America - A Critical Review, 52 AMERIcAN
ANTHROPOLOGIST 483 (1950). Goldschmidt asserts that in understanding the organization
of American society, "the fluidity of class position and the force of the cultural denial of
class must always be kept in mind." Id. at 495.
172. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and
the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. Rav. 799, 802 (2003) ("Class is important in its
own right, but in the United States people usually do not talk much about it.").
173. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC.
452, 454 (1997).
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advancement. 1 7 The existence of class distinctions would belie the long-
cherished ideal of upward mobility.
In this section, I first explore American resistance to acknowledging
the role of class in society. I then ask if class exists, how is it to be defined?
Finally, I explore some of the class presumptions embodied in contracts
doctrine.
When Oprah Winfrey hosted a show entitled "What Class Are You?
Inside America's Taboo Topic,' '7 I was struck by the layers of irony and
paradox it presented. Here is the richest black woman in America, born
into one of its poorest families, 176 confronting the existence of class when
her own situation would seem to deny it: How can the American Dream
be a myth when Oprah is its very embodiment? In an interview with
Robert Reich, former labor secretary for the Clinton Administration,
Oprah herself deals with the seeming contradiction:
WENDY: My name is Wendy, and I grew up in a family that
didn't have a lot of money, and I'm now middle class ....
My sister is my biggest critic. She's always saying things to me
like I'm phony, and who am I trying to pretend to be, where
do I think I came from? And I just have high standards for my-
self, because I believe in the American dream. I know that in
my future I will have my big house, my fantasy engagement
ring, nice cars, because I work hard. And if you work hard, you
can Ichieve anything.
WINFREY; I believe that. Are we wrong to believe that Bob?
174. See, eg., Mahoney, supra note 172, at 831 ("Many Americans identify with 'mid-
die class' status.").
175. Apparently, the topic was so taboo Oprah had a difficult time finding partici-
pants. See Oprah Winfrey Show: What Class Are You? Inside America's Taboo Topic (Harpo
Prods., Inc. television broadcast Apr. 21, 2006) (noting that class is "a topic so taboo, so
controversial, my producers had a hard time getting people to even talk about this."). Dur-
ing the show, Oprah interviewed a series of people from all social strata-from those born
into enormous wealth, like Jamie Johnson, heir to the Johnson & Johnson fortune, to those
who live from paycheck to paycheck, and even those who apparently had fallen from great
heights. Nicole Buffett, granddaughter of Warren Buffett, the second richest man in the
world, identified herself as "middle class." Nicole Buffett is employed by a rich family for
whom she does "a lot of organizing of things in their home, organizing of toys." Id. She
neither has a trust fund nor will she inherit any of her grandfather's vast fortune. Id.
176. With an estimated fortune of $1.5 billion, Oprah is the richest woman in enter-
tainment. See Lea Goldman & Kiri Blakeley, The Twenty Richest Wonen in Entertainnent,
FORBES.COM, Jan. 18, 2007, http://-vwwv.forbes.com/2007/01/17/richest-women-
entertainment-tech-media-cz-lgrichwomen070118womenstarslander.html. She was
raised in an impoverished family in rural Mississippi. Id. (follow "Oprah Winfrey" hyper-
link).
[VOL. 14:1
Is a Burrito a Sandwich?
MR REICH: Well, we're not wrong to believe it. It's a very
important part of the American creed. But the fact of the mat-
ter is it is getting harder. It's getting harder because that ladder
is getting longer, it's getting harder because the middle rungs
of that ladder are not there any longer. It's getting harder be-
cause a lot of kids who are poor or working class are not
getting the schools that they need and are not having the con-
nections and the models of success they need.
WINFREY: Yeah. Well, listen, I am a believer in the American
dream of rags to 'iches, because I was just sitting here thinking
about what class I was born into. I wasn't even lower class. I
don't know if there's a class for po. Not poor, but po ....
Mr. REICH: Oprah, you are a model. That's a great model for
America.You are a model. But I'll tell you...
WINFREY:Yes. It's a model, it's a model. It's a model.
77
In a land where Horatio Alger's heroes are revered for their ability to "pull
themselves up by their own bootstraps," '8 the reality that one's potential
may be circumscribed by one's parentage does not sit well. Even so,
Oprah eventually had to concede that class mobility was difficult, and her
own rise rather unique."9
177. Oprah Winfrey Show, supra note 175, at 12-13.
178. Cf IvAN LIGHT & CAROLYN ROSENSTEIN, RACE, ETHNCITY AND ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP IN URBAN AMERICA 205 (1995). "In Horatio Alger's nineteenth-century children's
novels, initially disadvantaged young men overcome obstacles 'by luck and pluck' .... [I]n
contemporary American culture, the "Horatio Alger tradition" stands for a philosophy of
rugged individualism ... [with] a profound faith in the ability of determined individuals to
succeed by dint of supreme efforts."
179. Reich and Winfrey had the following exchange:
Mr. REICH: But unfortunately, we live in a society in which most the [sic]
important predictor of where you're going to end up in terms of class and
also wealth is your parents' class and their wealth, because they can send you
to a good school, they can afford a good--a good suburban school. They can
tend [sic] send you to extracurricular activities. They can-they can make
sure they have models all around you and connections.
WINFREY: Because most people, regardless of what happens for some peo-
ple like myself, most people end up being in the same class that their parents
were born into.
Mr. REICH: Most people end up in the same class as their parents.
Oprah Witfrey Show, supra note 175, at 13.
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What is class anyway? A good, all-purpose definition is hard to come
by, but the search crosses disciplines as sociologists, lawyers and others seek
an understanding of the elusive concept.' 80 Professor Martha Mahoney
suggests "[t]he term is unfamiliar, packed with many different meanings,
and uncomfortably radical."'' Discussions of class for some raise seem-
ingly outmoded references to communism and the revolution of the
proletariat, but on the rare occasion class is explored in American popular
culture there is little radicalism to be found. Rather, class is defined
strictly in consumerist terms. Erin, a guest on the Oprah show, makes the
point:
ERIN: Because of my class, I definitely do like to look a cer-
tain way. I like to wear the clothes that I wear and the-have
the bags that I have so I can definitely fit into the upper class
level. Even my kids are judged by social class. By the age of 10
if you don't have Limited Too clothes, Gap, Abercrombie,
American Eagle, then you don't fit in.'
82
Class status is signaled by an ostentatious display of consumption. What
you wear defines who you are-your place in the social hierarchy.'83 Pro-
fessor Walter Goldschmidt finds an explanation for this consumption-
oriented definition of class in, among other things, the fact that American
society is predominantly urban and impersonal:
[T]he general secular character of American society, the ur-
banization of its population and consequent depersonalization
of social relationships, and the overwhelming importance of
pecuniary considerations in everyday life combine to render a
generically fiscal value system operative upon all major seg-
ments of the society. The jealously guarded privacy in financial
matters requires this to be further symbolized; hence the
180. See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 171, at 483 ("The sociologists have, from the
beginning, struggled with the problem, and in the past decade students of the other social
disciplines have attacked it .... [I]ts implications have been discussed by educators and by
at least the psychologically oriented portion of the medical profession.").
181. Mahoney, supra note 172, at 802.
182. Oprah Winfrey Show, supra note 175, at 7.A guest,Wendy, commented:
I love my $200 jeans and my Chanel glasses and my designer clothes, because
I worked very hard for them. People's perception of me is that I'm snotty or
snobby or unapproachable because of the way that I dress or maybe the way
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importance of occupation (source of income) and expendi-
tures (its public display). 84
Apparently, if you have little opportunity for intimate exchange with your
neighbor, the only remaining option is to inform him of your wealth by
lavish display. Interestingly, this blatant exhibition is reserved for the pre-
tenders-the "wannabes" and the moderately wealthy. The truly upper
class, those who have had generations to acclimate to a great deal of
wealth, feel little need to overtly signal their privilege.t 5 And just as
American popular culture defines upper class by patterns of conspicuous
consumption, lower class is defined by a lack of the same: "I buy, therefore
I am" is the mantra of the middle class, and those unable to partake simply
do not exist. 186
184. Goldschmidt, supra note 171, at 493.
185. In their discussion of "old money" versus "new money," Oprah andJamie John-
son, heir to the Johnson & Johnson fortune, clarify the distinction between what I call
"the pretenders"-those who want to be perceived as wealthy and those with modest
wealth-and the truly wealthy:
Mr. JOHNSON: And yeah, I mean, it's-it's that-that is really kind of how
it was played in my family. And I think it's pretty much because the culture
that my father is a part of and this unspoken rule among the wealthy never
to talk about class.
WINFREY:Yeah.
Mr.JOHNSON: ... and never, really, to talk about money.
WINFREY: Well, that would be old money, because new money now, that's
all they do is talk about it.
Mr.JOHNSON:Yeah.
WINFREY: Right? They're blinging and blinging and blinging, you know
what I mean?Yeah.
Mr.JOHNSON: Yeah, I think that is true. I think certainly it is part-more a
part of the old world elite.
Oprah Winfrey Show, supra note 175, at 17.
186. In a poignant exchange between Oprah and a guest, James, a self-identified
member of the working class, describes his sense of alienation and invisibility given his
status:
JAMES: Hi. My name is James. I was born poor. But I work every day, but
I'm part of the working poor class of people. Upper class people, to me, you
can tell when they've got more than you have .... An upper class person
tends to look down on a person that don't [sic] have anything, like you're
just nobody. I don't have much in my life, but I am somebody. Maybe one of
these days I'll have some things, but I won't walk around snooty.
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The perception of Oprah's guests that class is about consumption
represents the dominant view, but as Mahoney writes: "When people in
America refer to 'class" they usually mean status rather than economic
relations of power.,1 ' The distinction between class and status is subtle but
significant: "Class is differentiated from status in that the latter suggests a
range and continuum, while class connotes a degree of unity and some
form of homogeneity among its members. 1 8 Admittedly, a true under-
standing of the class/status divide requires-dare I say it?--some
examination of the Marxist critique of labor and capital, but that is a task
for another day.89 Simply put, class is an organizational system for struc-
turing society-class lines once drawn are nearly impermeable, and
membership tends to be passed on from one generation to the next.1 90
WINFREY: So you sayJames-James, you say you often feel, what, invisible.
JAMES:Yeah. All the time. All the time.
Id. at 15.
This theme of invisibility also resonates in matters of race. In Invisible Man, Ralph
Ellison's nameless narrator, a youiig black man, recounts the tensions, struggles and hu-
miliations that have literally driven him underground. "I am an invisible man .... I am
invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me... When they approach me
they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination-indeed,
everything and anything except me,' RALPH- ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 3 (Spec. 30th Anni-
versary Ed., Random House)(1952).
187. Mahoney, supra note 172, at 823.
188. Goldschmidt, supra note 171, at 491.
189. Mahoney uses "the term 'status' to refer to economic and social inequality that
does not consider relations of group power and exploitation and the term 'class' to refer to
economic inequality constructed through relationships of power and exploitation between
social groups." Mahoney, supra note 172, at 827.
Mahoney notes two major concepts of class and status that divide social and politi-
cal theory. "One, associated with Max Weber, analyzes economic participation through a
focus on distribution and the market and emphasizes status as an important aspect of
structural inequality. The other, associated with Karl Marx, emphasizes class relations in a
system of production and the exploitation of labor by capital." Id. at 818.
190. Cf Malamud, supra note 173. In what sounds suspiciously like a vision of poten-
tial class warfare, Oprah and Reich address why a discussion of class in America is even
necessary:
WINFREY: So, why should we care about class?
Mr. REICH: If the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer
and everybody in the middle is worried about keeping where they are, our
society could come apart, Oprah. I mean, it is-it's happened before in his-
tory. Societies are fragile things. They're based on trust. And if people don't
feel that they have a fair chance of getting ahead, if they feel that-in this
case, 40 percent of all the wealth in this country is held by the top 1 percent
and they're giving it to their children and their children and their children, a
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Status is more flexible; one's status can rise or fall with one's job, income,
and consumption patterns.'9' Thus, Oprah Winfrey's change in status can-
not deny the existence of class in America.
Despite the difficulties in defining it, and notwithstanding the deni-
als as to its very existence, class has played a central tole in shaping
American law. Considerations of class are inherent in many of the doc-
trines underlying contract law. It is useful to go back to the foundational
principle of freedom of contract to illustrate the point. The cult of indi-
vidualism is the single defining characteristic of the doctrine; the state's
role in enforcing procedurally-fair contracts is limited, and personal re-
sponsibility rests with the parties to ensure the terms of their. exchange
are equitable: "Either party is supposed to look out for his own interests
and his own protection. Oppressive bargains can be avoided by careful
shopping around. Everyone has complete freedom of choice with regard
to his partner in contract-. .. But in order for this narrative of personal
choice and individual autonomy to operate effectively, it requires a world
where parties "meet each other on a footing of social and approximate
economic equality"''193 In short, it requires a classless society.
In Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
Professor Friedrich Kessler lays out the mythical world in which an unfet-
tered notion of freedom of contract can properly function:
The individualism of our rules of contract law, of which free-
dom of contract is the most powerful symbol, is closely tied up
with the ethics of free enterprise capitalism and the ideals of
justice of a mobile society of small enterprisers, individual
merchants and independent craftsmen.
9 4
This bucolic vision acknowledges not everyone will benefit equally:
Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not guaran-
tee that all members of the community will be able to make
use of it to the same extent. On the contrary, the law, by pro-
tecting the unequal distribution of property, does nothing to
lot of people feel excluded. That's not good for society. That doesn't keep
America together.
Oprah Winfrey Show, supra note 175, at 23.
191. For example, Malamud points out that in black middle class families, parents
often have a difficult time passing their status on to their children. Deborah C. Malamud,
Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1847, 1891-92 (1996).
192. Kessler, supra note 102, at 630.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 640. See also Kennedy, supra note 106, at 568-69. (laying out the basic
assumptions and rules that make up freedom of contract).
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prevent freedom of contract from becoming a one-sided privi-
lege. 95
Once both parties have manifested assent to the bargain, the state's interest
in policing the terms of the contract is limited at best:
Since a contract is the result of the free bargaining of parties
who are brought together by the play of the market and who
meet each other on a footing of social and approximate eco-
nomic equality, there is no danger that freedom of contract
will be a threat to the social order as a whole.
196
But that world-the world of individual merchants and craftsmen
equally-yoked-is dead, if it ever really existed. As Kessler notes, once
capitalism moved from small enterprises and intense competition to mo-
nopolies, the meaning of the contractual relationship was radically
altered.197 The rise of the unconscionability doctrine is a direct recogni-
tion of the impact of class on contracts.198
Designed to police the bargain struck between unequal parties, the
doctrine allows a court to refuse enforcement of a contract deemed to be
195. Kessler, supra note 102, at 640.
196. Id. at 630.
197. Id. at 640 ("With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate
trend of competitive capitalism towards monopoly, the meaning of contract has changed
radically."). Kessler went on to note that "freedom of contract must mean different things
for different types of contracts. Its meaning must change with the social importance of the
type of contract and with the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author of the ... con-
tract." Id. at 642.
198. In a provocative essay exploring this point, James Gordley places unconscion-
ability squarely in the tradition of fairness:
In the Aristotelian tradition, it is not hard to see why a court will not enforce
unfair terms: the concept of fairness belongs to the definition of contract. A
contract of exchange is an act of commutative justice in which the value of
what each party gives should equal that of what he receives, thereby preserv-
ing each party's share of purchasing power.
Gordley, supra note 81, at 17. Gordley takes issue with the efficiency rationale of modern
economists:
The reason courts give relief when terms are unfair, I suppose, is that other-
wise one of the parties would have been put to extra expense acquainting
himself with the risks and burdens the contract imposes on him, and then
objecting .... I do not think one can explain what courts have done for
centuries by recent insights about efficiency supplied by those who are
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unconscionable.'99 In recognizing notions of fairness, oppression and lack
of meaningful choice, the unconscionability doctrine repudiates the un-
derlying premise of freedom of contract that parties are meeting "on a
footing of social and approximate economic equality.' '2°° In that way, un-
conscionability is almost unapologetically paternalistic; 20 1 it recognizes
that, in the immortal words of the pigs that ran the humans out of George
Orwell's Animal Farm to establish themselves as the new master class,
"Everyone is equal, but some are more equal than others. 20 2
2. Little Donkeys and Big Gamblers: A Culinary Tour of Class
Class, like race, played an unconscious but significant role in the
White City opinion. It is not of course the class of the parties that is rele-
vant, but rather the class of the disputed items-the sandwich and burrito.
In this section, I set off on the trail of the burrito and sandwich, tracing
their origins back to the Motherland. Along the way, I argue that class-
based images of the burrito and sandwich affected the White City deci-
sion. In my view, part of the explanation for the chorus of agreement that
a burrito cannot be a sandwich-the "duh!" response-lies in the differ-
ence in class of the two items. Descended from English nobility,
sandwiches are generally perceived as "higher class" than burritos. But
White City also illustrates a broader theme: the convergence of race and
class in American society. What is interesting is that the sandwich is able
to straddle both the low and high-class world, while the burrito is con-
signed exclusively to the low class realm.
199. The open question regarding unconscionability is how the term is to be de-
fined. Both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code
contain similar unconscionability provisions. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2007).
Unfortunately, the Code provision is not a model in clarity. As Professor Arthur Leff
famously noted, "If reading this section makes anything clear it is that reading this section
alone makes nothing clear about the meaning of 'unconscionable' except perhaps that it is
pejorative." Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code--The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485,487 (1967). We do know the purpose of the doctrine is to prevent
any "oppression or unfair surprise" of the weaker party, and the most durable definition of
unconscionability can be found in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 E2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965): "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Williams, 350 F2d at 449.
200. Kessler, supra note 102, at 630.
201. Paternalism exists within "any legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground
that it would be contrary to the actor's own welfare." Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and
the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763,763 (1983). The central premise of paternalist rules is
that the one must be protected firom assenting to terms not in her best interest--even
when such assent is voluntary, and may in fact be in her short-term best interest.
202. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Russell Baker preface, Signet Classic 1996)
(1946). This reference is particularly appropriate in a discussion of class because the book
was a satire of the Russian Revolution and Stalin's Russia.
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The sandwich has a rather illustrious lineage. It was born sometime
in the Eighteenth century when the profligate gambler John Montagu,
the Fourth Earl of Sandwich, faced a daunting dilemma: Should he extri-
cate himself from the gaming table in order to get a bite to eat?20 3 In a fit
of inspiration, the Earl determined his meals should be brought to him at
the table; but to avoid sullying the cards (Who doesn't hate dirty cards?),
he confined himself to eating his meat layered in between bread. In mod-
ern times, we may well have labeled the Earl an addict and prescribed an
intervention or the nearest Gambler's Anonymous meeting, but the
Eighteenth century apparently was more forgiving-at least of the upper
class. By the time the word first appears in print in 1762, the sandwich
had become "truly English," and so much a staple of the upper class that
one "was able to observe numerous important contemporaries supping off
cold meat 'or a Sandwich'.
'204
The history of the burrito is decidedly more pedestrian. It is said to
have originated in northwestern Mexico where it was made popular by
gold miners.200 Originally made using donkey meat,2 °6 the burrito was a
popular meal because it was filling and portable, slipping easily into the
miners' saddlebags.07 In short, the burrito was a cheap and nourishing
way to feed people who worked hard for a living and could not afford to
spend a great deal of money on food.
The class-bound imagery of the two items stand in marked contrast:
The sandwich evokes images of wealthy indolence-a pampered English
dandy who fills his days with wine, women, and gambling. Images of the
burrito call to mind endless sweat and toil. The word itself-"little don-
key" 2 -- harkens to a beast of burden laboring under a harsh, burning sun.
Indeed, even the bread making process elicits different images for the
sandwich than for the burrito. While sandwich-bread making calls to
mind industrial processes, Alan Davidson describes the process of making
tortillas200 in this way:
[C]onsider the scene just after daybreak in the towns and vil-
lages across the Republic. Along the nearly empty streets,
women walk slowly but purposefully, brightly coloured plastic
203. DAVIDSON, supra note 24, at 692.
204. Id.
205. Wikipedia.org, Timeline of the Burrito, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline
_of the burrito (last visited June 8, 2008).
206. Janey M. Rifkin, A View of Acculturation, HisPa ic TIMES MAGAZINE (2001), avail-
able at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOFWK/is_2_24/ai_73325316.
207. The burrito was originally called a "burro". Mike Dunne, Burritos, or 'Burros,'
Traced to Mexico, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 22, 2003, at F4.
208. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 300 (1986).
209. "The stuffed tortilla called a burrito, which means literally 'little burro,' first
appeared on a menu in Los Angeles's famed El Cholo Spanish Cafe in the 1930s." 1 AN-
DREW F SMIT, FOOD AND DRINK IN AMERICA 171 (2004).
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buckets hefted on their shoulders. They are on their way to or
from the mill, about the business of getting their maize ground
for the daily bread (tortillas).2 0
Admittedly, there is some element of romanticism in the image of women
in solidarity heading off to the mill to ground up the day's bread. But one
quickly realizes the tortilla-making process is a long and arduous one:
Each night, they boil dried maize with water and lime, leaving
it to soak overnight. In the morning, they drain it and rub the
skins off the grains, before placing it in a bucket to take it off
to the mill. There it is ground into a coarse wet flour (masa, or
nixtamal). Once home again, they will shape it by hand or by
hand press into flat cakes (tortillas).2 '
While these differing images may have some impact on public per-
ception, does class imagery influence legal decision making? Certainly.
Consider the images evoked in Williams v. Walker Thomas and In re Rodri-
guez, two cases previously cited above. In Williams, the picture of a single
woman with seven children purchasing a stereo with her $218 a month
welfare check was sufficient to elicit the paternal instincts of the court. In
re Rodriguez similarly evokes class-based imagery. The opinion made much
of the fact that Mr. Rodriguez was allegedly "a very ignorant and illiterate
man ' 212 and that his speech befitted someone "of his class and humble
condition of life." 2 3 Thus, conferring citizenship on Mr. Rodriguez re-
quired the court to overlook not just his race, but also his class. It was
ultimately able to do so because Congress had not established class-based
limitations on citizenship.
214
Class played an interesting role in the White City dispute. In my
view, the court's gut-level reaction that burritos are not sandwiches-and
the public's overwhelming support-can be traced back to the burrito's
low-class status. But equally as compelling is the convergence of class and
race in the decision. As Professor Deborah Malamud observes, "class in
America is intertwined with race, gender, and ethnicity, each of which is
part of the structure of economic relations in this country.' ' 2 s Both Wil-
liams and In Re Rodriguez illustrate that interplay, which is too often
overlooked in any discussion of class and race in American society. It is
this convergence that helps to explain why the sandwich can straddle
210. DAvIDSON, supra note 24, at 499.
211. Id.
212. In re Rodriguez, 81 F at 337.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 355 ("Congress has not seen fit to require of applicants for naturalization
an educational qualification, and courts should be careful to avoid judicial legislation.").
215. Malamud, supra note 173, at 454.
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high- and low-class status, while the burrito is firmly entrenched in the
low class realm. For example, the quintessentially English cucumber
sandwich evokes a far different image than the Italian-inspired Hoagie-
an overwhelming meat-cheese-lettuce-tomatoes-and-onions laden con-
coction that is topped off with a dash of oregano-vinegar dressing and
served on an Italian roll. 16 The Hoagie's status as the invention of Italian
dockworkers in Philadelphia places it firmly in the low-class category,
while cucumber sandwiches are consumed by royalty. Yet, both the cu-
cumber sandwich and the hoagie are able to occupy the category
"sandwich" without objection. The burrito meets resistance not just be-
cause of its class but also because of its race-and the way the two play off
each other.
C. Culture
Culture is defined as "a set of values, beliefs, traditions, [or] customs
... which serve to identify and bind a group together."217 It may be said,
for example, that a firm or industry has a "business culture" because the
individuals who make up that sector share a common understanding on
particular issues; similarly, a religious organization can have a culture, as
can a racial or linguistically similar group of individuals. But culture is
ever changing. As Professor Leti Volpp notes, "[w]e should understand
culture as being in a constant state of becoming, not as self-contained and
impermeable."218 One culture seeps into the next, and the experience
transforms the two into something wholly new and different. In public
discourse, however, the legal implications of culture are routinely ignored.
Professor Volpp maintains that "[l]egal invocations of 'culture' too often
fail to understand culture as imbricated with the material or the political,
but rather, present culture as if it is somehow cordoned off from eco-
nomic and political concerns' 2 9 Law and culture are intertwined; indeed,
law is culture. Law is a reflection of our culture-of our shared values,
216. The most widely accepted story on the invention of the Hoagie centers on an
area of Philadelphia known as Hog Island, which was home to a shipyard during World
War 1 (1914-1918). The Italian immigrants working there would bring giant sandwiches
made with cold cuts, spices, oil, lettuce, tomatoes, onions, and peppers for their lunches.
These workers were nicknamed 'hoggies.' Over the years, the name was attached to the
sandwiches, but under a different spelling."
Stradley, supra note 18, at 2.
217. DAvIDTHROsBY, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 63(2001).
218. Leti Volpp, Migrating Identities: On Labor, Culture, and Law, 27 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 507, 513 (2002).
219. Id. at 516. The Haitian writer Edwidge Danticat makes a similar point:
"[E]conomics and politics are ... intrinsically related in Haiti. Who is in power determines
to a great extent whether or not people will eat." Edwidge Danticat, We Are Ugly, But We
Are Here, THE CARmaIBE WImER (1996), available at http://www.webster.edu/-corbetre/
haiti/literature/danticat-ugly.htm (last visited October 17, 2008).
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customs and ideals. Professor David Dow notes "we express ourselves in
the laws we enact, and there is no better measure of a culture than the
laws that govern it."'220 In this section, I explore the impact of culture on
contract law-and vice versa.
1. The Culture of Contracts
Contract doctrine incorporates community norms into the agree-
ments of private parties, even when the parties have not explicitly
articulated those norms within the contract. For example, both the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("UCC") and the Restatement of Contracts
recognize industry custom-or the "usage of trade"-as a legitimate aid
in the interpretation of contracts.2 2 1 Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil
Co. presents a controversial use of custom to interpret the express term of
a contract.
In Nanakuli, the contract provided the price of asphalt would be
"Shell's Posted Price at time of delivery."223 While the term seemed clear
on its face, Nanakuli argued it was the custom of the industry in Hawaii
for Big Oil to "price protect" asphalt purchasers. Price protection meant
Shell oil would shield its customers from market volatility; it did so by
allowing those who had previously bid on paving contracts to purchase
the asphalt for the price in effect at the time of the bid, instead of the
"posted price. 224 Despite the contract's seemingly unambiguous term, the
Ninth Circuit held it permissible to admit what appeared to be contradic-
tory evidence of custom to give meaning to the parties' agreement. The
court justified its decision by noting "[t]he [UCC] would have us look
beyond the printed pages of the contract to usages and the entire com-
mercial context of the agreement in order to reach the 'true
understanding' of the parties."
2 2
Fisher v. Congregation Bnai Yitzhok represents a different axis in the
intersection of culture and contracts. In Fisher, an orthodox Jewish con-
gregation hires a rabbi to perform religious services. After the parties
signed the contract, but before Rabbi Fisher could begin performance,
the congregation adopted a reform approach; men and women were
"26permitted to sit together during services . Arguing that officiating in a
220. David R. Dow, Law School Feminist Chic and Respect for Persons: Comments on
Contract Theory and Feminism in the Flesh-Colored Band Aid, 28 Hous. L. REv. 819, 819-20
(1991).
221. U.C.C. § 1-205; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTrRACTS § 203 (1981).
222. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
223. Id. at 778.
224. Id. at 777-78.
225. Id. at 780.
226. Fisher v. Congregation B'naiYitzhok, 110 A.2d 881,882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955).
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trefah227 synagogue would violate his beliefs, Rabbi Fisher refused to per-
form services and instead sued for damages under the contract. 228 The
issue for the court was whether the contract between Fisher and the con-
gregation contained an understanding that the synagogue was, and would
remain, orthodox. In order to address the question, the court first deter-
mined it had to read into the contract both the states' laws and the
"Hebrew law as to separate seating ' ,229 because the parties had implicitly
incorporated the Torah into their contract. 23 Although the contract con-
tained no express term on the status of the synagogue, the court ruled the
parties had contracted on the common understanding that the congrega-
tion would remain orthodox; such an intention was implicit in the
contract and had to be read into it.
231
Contract law thus incorporates culture into private agreements-
both explicitly and implicitly. Culture takes the form of a shared under-
standing between the parties. In both Nanakuli and Fisher, the parties have
the same (or a similar) culture, but what happens when cultural norms
diverge?
2.White Bread vs.Tex-Mex: Law and the Hybridization of Culture
The impact of culture is probably the most subtle of the three influ-
ences on the White City opinion. Chef Schlesinger's view that a burrito
cannot be a sandwich because it does not share the same European cul-
tural heritage 232 provides the framework for analyzing that impact.
Schlessinger's view of culture is static and impermeable, but American
culture-and cuisine-is both fluid and embracing. For better or worse,
America is the land of the "melting pot," with immigrants arriving from
around the world. But, while the United States integrated all of these cul-
tures into a uniquely American experience, the path to integration was
markedly different for some. Over time, Greek, Irish and Italian immi-
grants-to name just a few-assimilated seamlessly within the broader
majority culture. Groups such as Mexicans integrated with their status as
227. A trefah synagogue is one that violates Jewish law. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 883.
230. Id. at 883-84.
231. Id. at 884.
232. See Schlesinger Affidavit, supra note 141 and accompanying text. It is not clear
under Schlessinger's definition whether even the Mexican torta would be considered a
sandwich. Wikipedia (Which constitutes our common understanding of so many things!)
defines torta as "a Mexican sandwich, served on an oblong 6-8 inch firm, crusty white
sandwich roll, called a bolillo, telera or birote. Torras can be served hot or cold. Common
ingredients may include but are not limited to:" marinated pork or steak, shredded beef,
green pepper fried in egg batter or beef tongue. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Torta (last visited June 9, 2008).
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"the other" intact.233 While race and class play a significant role in explain-
ing the differing experiences, culture also has an impact. Like Mexicans,
burritos have had a tough time assimilating. Both the sandwich and bur-
rito have becoming quintessentially American, but their status as cultural
icon is vastly different. The sandwich is un-hesitantly American, while the
burrito is perceived as a hybrid Tex-Mex concoction that is neither fish
nor fowl. It is only when the burrito is appropriated and repackaged as a
"wrap," does it attain All-American status. In this section, I examine how
cultures and cuisines are adopted into the American "brand" and the dif-
fering treatment they experience.
There is something about white bread sandwiches that for imrm-
grants scream of belonging. I remember in elementary school being sent
off for the day with a bag lunch lovingly packed by my mother. Invariably,
my bag would be filled with wonderful Haitian food (my mother was a
good cook)-poisson, boulet, griot and du riz ak pwa,3 were family staples.
But when I sat at the cafeteria table, what I longed for-what I needed-
was a peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwich on white bread. It seemed every-
one in the world was eating a white bread sandwich, except me. For
whatever reason, I could never get my immigrant mother to accept sand-
wiches as proper lunchtime fare.
The white bread experience seems to resonate with children from
across the immigrant spectrum. Years after the experience, Raefaela, a
daughter of farm workers in California's lower San Joaquin Valley, recalls
"how embarrassed she was to eat her tortilla-wrapped burritos alongside
her classmates who had white-bread sandwiches. '23 Two scenes from the
movie My Big Fat Greek Wedding encapsulate both the poignancy and
comedy of the experience: In the first scene, a young, dark-haired Greek
child-Toula Portokalos--sits alone in a lunchroom full of chatting,
laughing blonde girls eating their white bread sandwiches. 36 Toula slowly
pulls out her lunch. Immediately, Popular Blonde Girl #1, sitting at a table
filled with worshipping followers, takes the opportunity to pounce:
"What's that?" she asks.
233. Although Mexicans have been portrayed as an ethnic group that eventually will
assimilate as other (European) groups have done, Laura Gomez, Richard Delgado, and
others disagree. See, e.g., GOMEZ, supra note 145, at 1; Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in
the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the Neoliberal Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 TEx. L. REv.
489, 504-05 (2004).
234. Fish, meatballs, fried pork and rice and beans.
235. Dunne, supra note 207, at F4. Burritos were a staple of life at the time. Raefaela
remembers her parents, who were farm workers, making burritos-filled with potatoes,
cheese, eggs and chili--and taking them to work. Id.
236. My Bic FAT GREEK WEDDING (Warner Bros. 2002). The movie is a romantic
comedy film directed by Joel Zwick and starring Nia Vardalos, who is also the screen-
writer.
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"Moussaka" 2 37 Toula replies.
"Moose caca?" she sneers, sending her cohorts into gales of
laughter. 38
In the second scene, we are transported almost two decades ahead, and a
now thirty-year old Toula stands at the brink of spinsterhood (at least by
Greek standards).239 Seeking to transform her ordinary life, she goes back
to school. Once again, Toula finds herself in a lunchroom full of perfect
blonde women eating-of course-white bread sandwiches. But this time,
rather than sitting alone at the table for rejects, Toula joins the others. This
time, she has her own white bread sandwich, which she happily munches
while laughing and chatting with the others. At last, she is one of them.
She is accepted.
By cloaking herself with the cultural icon of the dominant group,
Toula is able to assimilate. But Toula's experience is made possible by her
status as Greek. Although initially ostracized, Greeks and Greek culture
were ultimately incorporated into the majority culture; their differences
became charming cultural quirks rather than an excuse for discrimination.
But for Mexicans and other non-white immigrants, the experience is dif-
ferent. While Mexicans and their culture have become part of the
American experience,2 40 their incorporation is as a hybrid rather than a
seamless integration.
The assimilation of sandwiches and burritos in American cuisine has
some similarities. Both food items share an important trait-although
they were invented elsewhere, burritos and sandwiches have become
quintessentially American. In a scholarly discussion of Mexican cuisine,
for example, no mention is made of the burrito.241 Similarly, while the
sandwich was once hailed as "truly English," its Oxford Companion to Food
entry now features almost exclusively American creations-the club,
237. Moussaka is a traditional Greek dish with layers of ground lamb or red meat,
sliced eggplant and tomato, topped with a white sauce and baked. Wikipedia.org,
Moussaka, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moussaka (last visited June 9,2008).
238. My Big Fat Greek Wedding, supra note 236.
239. As Toula says, "Greek girls are supposed to do three things in life: marry Greek
boys, make Greek babies, and feed everyone, until the day we die." My BIG FAT GREEK
WEDDING, supra note 236.
240. Mexicans are typically seen as belonging to a "foreign" culture. It is important to
remember, however, that at least in states like California, New Mexico and Texas, it is the
American culture that is foreign given that those states were originally part of Mexico. For
an interesting discussion of the incorporation of those states into the United States, see
GOMEZ,SUpra note 145.
241. See DAVIDSON, supra note 24, at 499-500. Indeed, some claim the burrito is an
American invention. Dunne, supra note 207, at F4 (noting that "[b]urritos have been around
since at least 1934, when the word first saw print in the United States .... The word
['burrito'] may not have come into play extensively in California until the 1960s.").
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Reuben and submarine sandwiches, among others.: 4 Thus, both the
sandwich and burrito have become "Americanized." In the process, both
have evolved considerably from their roots. American sandwiches, in con-
trast to their sometimes dainty cousins from across the pond (think
cucumber sandwiches), range from the Dagwood-once described as "a
mountainous pile of dissimilar leftovers precariously arranged between
two slices of bread"2 43 -to the beef-and-sauce laden Sloppy Joe, and the
now-popular wrap sandwich. Burritos too have strayed considerably from
the traditional rice-and-beans (with a bit of donkey meat thrown in) and
now come bursting with a number of exotic stuffings to tempt the
American palate.244
Both the sandwich and burrito have intermingled with American
culture to produce a hybrid not easily recognized in its culture of origin.
But within American culinary circles, the sandwich is accepted as "truly
American," so much so that few are aware of its English ancestry. Burritos
are incorporated into the American culinary landscape as a "fusion" Tex-
Mex cuisine that retains its outsider status; as do Mexicans. 24' The name
242. DAVIDSON, supra note 24, at 692. In the Oxford Companion to Food, the listing of
sandwiches is all-American-the Reuben sandwich, a New York Jewish creation, the club
sandwich, which may have been named after double-decker 'club cars' running on U.S.
railroads from 1895, and the submarine sandwich, popular in the South.
243. Stradley, supra note 18, at 1. The Dagwood was invented as an homage to the
comic strip "Blondie," and the sandwich itself has spawned a number of chain sandwich
shops catering to Dagwood lovers in Florida. See Dagwood's Sandwich Shoppe Coming to
Lakewood Ranch, HERALDTRIBUNE.COM, May 3, 2007, available at http://
www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070503/BREAKING06/705030
11&start=l.
244. Qdoba Mexican Grill, the burrito chain at issue in the White City dispute, offers
Ancho Chile BBQ (roasted pork in a Mexican-style BBQ sauce), Grilled Vegetable (red
pepper, yellow squash, and zucchini), Fajita Ranchera, Queso, and Poblano Pesto signature
burritos on its menu. Qdoba Mexican Grill, http://www.qdoba.com/ (follow "Menu"
hyperlink; then follow "Signature Burritos" hyperlink) (last visited June 10, 2008).
Wahoo's Fish Taco, a chain with restaurants in California, Colorado, Hawaii and
Texas, offers Banzai burritos, with fish, shrimp, chicken, came asada or carnitas, and pep-
pers, onions, zucchini, broccoli, mushrooms, and cabbage. Wahoo's Fish Taco,
http://www.wahoos.com (follow "Wahoo's Menu" hyperlink and select state; then follow
"Banzai Burritos" hyperlink) (last visited June 10, 2008).
245. Part of the explanation for what I term the "hybridization" of Mexican and
American culture has to do with Mexicans themselves. In Chicano Narrative, Professor
Ramon Saldivar notes the unique status of Mexican Americans. Like Native Americans,
they became "an ethnic minority through the direct conquest of their homelands" when
Mexico lost the war with the United States in 1848. Saldivar maintains that under those
circumstances, Mexicans attempted tenaciously to cling to their traditional way of life-to
maintain their cultural values-where a new culture was being foisted on them. RAMON
SALDIVAR, CHIcANo NARRATIVE: THE DIALECTICS OF DIFFERENCE 13 (1990). A poem written
by America Paredes, entitled T7ie Mexico-Texan, demonstrates this hybridization effect:
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burrito itself-even if one is unaware, it means "little donkey"-speaks to
its south of the border origin.
Interestingly, the wrap seems to have jumped the fence in a way the
burrito cannot; despite their similarities, a wrap is considered both Ameri-
can and a sandwich while the burrito is not.246 Created with just one slice
of bread, the wrap looks suspiciously like a burrito-so much so that the
comedian George Lopez once said, "The best things brought to the U.S.
from Mexico are the tortilla and burrito. Now Americans steal it, and cre-
ate this phenomenon called a wrap.'
247
THE MEXICO-TEXAN
The Mexico-Texan he's one fonny man
Who leeves in the region that's north of the Gran',
Of Mexican father he born in these part,
And sometimes he rues it dip down in he's heart.
For the Mexico-Texan he no gotta lan',
He stomped on the neck on both sides of the Gran',
The dam gringo lingo he no cannot spik,
It twisters the tong and it makes you fill sick.
A cit'zen ofTexas they say that he ees,
But then, why they call him the Mexican Grease?
Soft talk and hard action, he can't understan',
The Mexico-Texan he no gotta Ian'....
Except for a few with their cunning and craft
He count just as much as a nought to the laft,
And they say everywhere, "He's a burden and drag,
He no gotta country, he no gotta flag."
He no gotta voice, all he got is the han'
To work like a burro, he no gotta lan'
Id. at 11.
246. What is the distinction between the wrap and the burrito? The American Heri-
tage Dictionary defines a wrap as "a flatbread, such as a tortilla or lavash, rolled around a
filling;" it defines a burrito as "flour tortilla wrapped around a filling, as of beef, beans, or
cheese." American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Joseph Pickett ed., 4th
ed. 2000), available at www.bartleby.com/61.
247. Tim O'Malley, Seizing the Burning Idea, AMERICAN VENTURE MAGAZINE, 2008,
http://ww.americanventuremagazine.com/article-print.php?idarticle= 117. George
Lopez is a well-known Mexican-American comedian. For a biography, see George Lopez,
http://www.georgelopez.com/bio/bioinfo.html (last visited June 10, 2008).
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III. CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT: REFLECTIONS ON LAW,
BURRITOS AND SANDWICHES




Once a dispute finds its way into a courtroom, the parties have proved
themselves unable to arrive at a shared understanding-perhaps they had
one that fell apart, or they never had one at all. Whatever the reason, it is
now for the court to discern the meaning of their agreement, often from
conflicting and competing alternatives. The process necessarily requires a
bit of "rough justice." Professor Robert Cover notes that legal interpreta-
tion is simply "a form of practical wisdom. 2 49 As such, the meaning the
court constructs may not accurately reflect what either party understood
to be the terms of their bargain. Contract interpretation is an objective
process, after all. The shift from the subjective theory has led courts to
adopt the notion of a common understanding as a guidepost in the quest
for meaning. I have sought to peer ever more closely into this common
understanding-what lies beneath it? The short (and long) answer is "eve-
rything." The common understanding of a society necessarily includes all
of its beliefs, prejudices and challenges. In White City, the court's common
understanding of the word sandwich embodies all of the underlying pre-
conceptions and misconceptions we hold concerning race, class and
culture.
Common sense will tell you that a burrito is not a sandwich, says
Judge Locke. Whose burrito? Whose sandwich? Whose common sense?
The problem with the White City opinion is not that the judge resorted
to common sense, but that he failed to see that he was omitting a great
deal of context. The White City opinion suggests the words burrito and
sandwich have a static, objective meaning that is consistent regardless of
context. The judge saw his task as finding and imposing that meaning. On
analysis, the term sandwich proved itself to be ambiguous, but rather than
discerning its meaning in this contract, the court imposed meaning using
a rather formalist approach of resorting to a single definition contained in
a dictionary. But legal interpretation does not exist in a vacuum-it is
always context-driven. Professor Cover puts it this way: "Legal interpreta-
tion ... can never be 'free;' it can never be the function of an
understanding of the text or word alone."250 Similarly, both the Restate-
248. Professor Robert Cover notes that at times, that meaning can have violent im-
plications. "Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death .... Legal
interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: A judge ar-
ticulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his
property, his children, even his life." Richard M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.
1601, 1601 (1986).
249. Id. at 1610.
250. Id. at 1617.
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ment and the UCC reject an approach to legal interpretation that ne-
glects the centrality of context.5 1
In failing to adequately examine the context in which the word is
to be defined, the court has adopted a common understanding that evis-
cerates the experience of many. In short, a common understanding that
focuses exclusively on the experience of the dominant group is no com-
mon understanding at all. As Professor Cover notes, "any commonality of
interpretation that may or may not be achieved is one that has its com-




The only context the court provides is an oblique one-the context of a
"common understanding." 2 3
CONCLUSION
Is a burrito a sandwich? How about a sushi roll? Perhaps a folded-
over slice of pizza (New York-style) or a calzone would fit the bill? Does
the Shepard's pot pie meet your definition of a sandwich? The Jamaican
patty? Would it matter if it was served on coco bread? I have argued in
this Article that common sense standing alone is not sufficient to answer
the legal question whether a burrito is a sandwich; I will concede, how-
ever, that in lay terms we do seem to have a common understanding of
what generally constitutes a sandwich. Most of us would probably agree
sushi is decidedly not a sandwich, nor is Shepard's pot pie for that matter.
A pizza? That would be stretching it. But I'm willing to bet we would
251. Indeed, although I maintain the term "sandwich" is ambiguous, as one scholar
notes whether a term is ambiguous or not, "the Restatement Second encourages the
parties to plumb the context surrounding the particular bargain to aid the trier of fact in
interpreting the 'term'-that is, ascertaining its 'meaning'." Stephen F Ross & Daniel
Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory
Interpretation, 87 GEo. L.J. 195, 205 (1998). Karl Llewellyn, the UCC's drafter, maintains
that "the law of the transaction is imbedded in the total situation and that the task of the
'law authority' is to discover it." Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and
Contract Method, 67 CoNELL L. REv. 785, 791 (1982).
252. Cover, supra note 248, at 1609.
253. Interestingly, I am not so sure that in Worcester, Massachusetts, where the dis-
pute was litigated, there truly would be a common understanding that burritos cannot be
sandwiches. Worcester is located in Central Massachusetts approximately 45 miles west of
Boston, has a population of 175,500 and is the second-largest city in New England. See
City of Worcester, Massachusetts, http://www.ci.worcester.ma.us/. See also U.S. Census
Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/
main.html?_lang=en (follow "Data Sets" hyperlink; then follow "American Community
Survey" hyperlink; then follow "Data Profiles" hyperlink; search "Worcester, Massachu-
setts"). Its Latino population is more than double that of Massachusetts in general, and is
almost four percent higher than the general U.S. population for Latinos. The population of
Worcester is relatively diverse, with Hispanics making up 18.9 % of the population as
compared with only 8.0 % of the population of the state. See id. If a burrito is not consid-
ered a sandwich in that context, perhaps it should be.
[VOL. 14:1
Is a Burrito a Sandwich?
have some heated arguments over the calzone. And I just might be able to
convince you that a Jamaican patty inserted in between coco bread is not
only heavenly but also a sandwich. We all have gut-level reactions to help
us arrive at an answer, and our instinctive reactions are not "wrong." They
are merely insufficient to provide legal meaning to a disputed term.
Legal interpretation requires not merely first level reactive reasoning,
but also second-level rationality. The second aspect to the exercise is par-
ticularly important because our first level reactions incorporate a
common understanding-if not properly managed-eviscerates context.
We revert to a "primitive formalism" that lacks subtlety, complexity or
nuance. My point in this Article was never to convince you that a burrito
is a sandwich. Rather, I took issue with the idea that either common
sense or a shared understanding of the term-rather than a rigorous ap-
plication of contract interpretation doctrine-is sufficient to give us the
answer.
So, is a burrito a sandwich? I don't know-it's ambiguous. Ironically,
had the court completed its analysis Panera likely would have lost anyway
because it drafted the contract. 54 Under the maxim omnia praesumuntur
contra proferentum, ambiguity should be interpreted against the drafter.2' s
254. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 7, White City Shopping Center, L.P v PR Rests., L.L.C., No. 2006-196313
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2006). Panera failed to define the term "sandwich," and arguably
it had notice. Before executing the lease, Panera knew that other Mexican-style restaurants
that served burritos existed near the shopping center. Id. If it wanted absolute protection,
it should have included Mexican-type restaurants within the exclusivity clause rather than
relying on a broad reading of sandwich.
255. But see, Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. Smith, 14 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 (1961) (hold-
ing that despite fact sales contract for used aircraft was prepared by attorneys for
defendant-with minimal input from plaintiff-court's declining to construe alleged am-
biguity against the plaintiffs did not appear to be error). See also, Tri-City Concrete Co. v.
A.L.A. Constr. Co., 179 N.E.2d 319, 320 (Mass. 1962) (holding that statement in letter
from concrete company to construction company providing that "sales memo" would
supplement and confirm construction company's order did not serve to incorporate terms
of"sales memo" as part of original contract).
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